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Abstract 
The author examines the impact of the external shock resulting from recent global 
economic crisis on industrialization of least developed countries. LDCs are marginalized 
in international trade and output, yet they are highly integrated into the world economy, 
suffer from structural weaknesses, balance of payments and fiscal constraints; and they 
are dependent on production and exports of primary commodities and external sources of 
finance. The commodity boom of 2003-08 which allowed them to accelerate their GDP 
and MVA was followed by a “bust”. Food and fuel importing LDCs, in particular, have 
suffered from both the “boom” and the “bust”. 
 As a result of the decline in their exports, workers remittances and external 
sources of finance, most LDCs have suffered from significant decline not only in their 
GDP and MVA, the closure of a number of their factories, thus unemployment, but also 
in their investment in production capacity 
 The exposure of their manufacturing sector to severe external competitive 
pressure (resulting inter alia from changes in the rules of the game on international 
competition, increased the need for nurturing their manufacturing sector. Yet, their policy 
space has diminished due to pre-mature trade liberalization and “market oriented” 
strategies imposed on them. As a result, despite the acceleration of growth in their MVA 
during the boom years, most LDCs have faced de-industrialization as compared with their 
situation in early 1980s. 
 The global economic crisis is a wake-up call for LDCs to reconsider their long-
term industrial and development strategies. There is no “one-size-fit-for-all” strategy, but 
we have made, in this paper, some common as well as specific policy proposals for 
industrial development of various groups of LDCs.  These countries still have some room 
to manoeuvre despite their loss of policy space. Further, in order to avoid the risk of 
human tragedy, particularly in Sub-Saharan countries we calls for changes in WTO rules 
and reconsideration of policies of IFIs towards LDCs , and resistance to the proposed 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Mehdi Shafaeddin is a development economist with a D.Phil. degree from Oxford 
University. He is the former Head, Macroeconomics and Development Policies Branch, 
UNCTAD. He is currently affiliated with the Institute of Economic Research, University 
of Neuchâtel, Switzerland and the author of many articles on trade and industrial policies. 
His recent work includes Trade Policy at the Crossroads: The Recent Experience of 
Developing Countries, Palgrave and Competitiveness and Industrial Development, 
Anthem Press, forthcoming. Comments can be sent to him through  
M.Shafaeddin@Gmail.com or M.Shafaeddin@Shafaeddin.com. 
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Executive Summary 
 
The recent global economic crisis has been unprecedented since the great depression of 
1929-32. The least developed countries have been affected by the crisis severely. 
Although they are not a homogeneous group, the LDCs have some common 
characteristics which make them extremely vulnerable to external shocks: they are 
marginalized in international trade and output, particularly for manufactured products: 
they are highly integrated into the world economy; they suffer from structural weaknesses, 
balance of payments and fiscal constraints; they are mostly highly indebted and 
dependent on production and exports of primary commodities and external sources of 
finance. The commodity boom of 2003-08 allowed increases in national savings, 
investment and the acceleration of GDP and MVA) of LDCs. Nevertheless, it was 
followed by a “bust” with detrimental impact on their long-term industrialization and 
development. Food and fuel importing LDCs, in particular, suffered from both the 
“boom” and the “bust”; the emergence of the economic crisis took place at the time they 
were facing high international prices of food and petroleum.  
 As a result of the global economic crisis, the prices of non-oil commodities and 
petroleum fell, from the peak to the trough, by over 36 per cent cent and 68 per cent, 
respectively. Nevertheless, food prices did not fall as much as the prices of other  
commodities and have picked up faster than other commodities after they reached their 
trough in December 2008. 
 It is projected that the growth rate of GDP of LDCs as a whole will decline from 
7.6 per cent in 2007 to 3.3 per cent in 2009; African and Island countries will be 
particularly affected, and also petroleum and mineral exporters, some of which will show 
negative GDP growth in 2009. The demand for manufactures, in general, will suffer not 
only from the fall in exports but also from changes in domestic demand as a result of the 
decline in the rate of growth of private consumption, which is projected to fall by 3 per 
cent, for example, in Sub-Saharan African countries  - most of which are LDCs. The 
decline in workers’ remittances is another important cause of the decline in domestic 
demand for manufactured goods in many LDCs. For example, for six African countries’ 
remittances were equivalent to more than 100 per cent of their total exports in 2007; and 
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the fall in the remittances is projected to reach over three per cent of GDP in some cases. 
A number of “manufactures exporter” LDCs will suffer, in particular, from the drop in 
their inflow of workers’ remittances as they account for a significant proportion of their 
GDP. For example, in 2008, workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP reached over 
27 per cent in the case of Lesotho, and 18 per cent, 17.8 per cent and 11 per cent in the 
cases of Haiti, Nepal and Bangladesh, respectively. Moreover, what is axed more is 
investment which has detrimental effects on the growth of production capacity. The 
deterioration in the balance of payments and fiscal constraints have led to a reduction in 
financial resources available for investment, and thus cancellation of some projects and a 
significant drop in investment outlays. For example, the rate of growth of investment is 
projected to decline, e.g. by over 12 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 The combination of fall in external and domestic demand together with the 
increased exposure of the manufacturing sector of LDCs to competitive pressure in 
internal and international markets has led to the closure of a number of factories in the 
manufacturing sector of LDCs in Asia and Africa, causing unemployment. The increased 
competitive pressure has taken place mainly due to changes in the rules of the game on 
competition in the international market and premature trade liberalization and the 
pursuance of “market oriented” strategies imposed on the economies of LDCs by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors. Changes in the global 
economy - including rapid technological change, globalization, new methods of 
production, and the emergence of China as a massive exporter of labour intensive 
products, have increased the competitive pressure on the manufacturing sector of least 
developed countries, particularly textiles and clothing which account for over two-thirds 
of their manufactured exports. Such changes have increased the need for nurturing the 
manufacturing sector in countries which are at early stages of industrialization. Yet, the 
policy space available to them has diminished. As a result, despite acceleration of growth 
in their MVA during the boom years, most LDCs have faced de-industrialization since 
the early 1980s. 
 The global economic crisis is a wake-up call for LDCs to reconsider their long-
term industrial and development strategies as the short-term counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policy tools available to them are very limited. Some selective import 
 5
restrictions under the “balance of payments clause” of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and capital controls would be helpful, but not sufficient. A debt moratorium, debt 
forgiveness and other concessional financial flows are urgently needed to provide LDCs 
with some temporary relief. But what is essential for the long-term development of LDCs 
is to increase their capacity to take the risk of external shocks and instability in export 
earnings. To do so, a different development and industrial strategy is required to diversify 
and upgrade their structure of production and trade.  
 We have argued in this study that there is no “one-size-fit-for-all” development 
strategy for LDCs as they include diverse economies despite their common problems. 
Accordingly we have made some common as well as specific policy proposals as follows. 
First, the market alone is not the only tool of coordination of economic activities; there 
are roles for market, enterprises and government, the relative importance of which should 
change during the process of industrialization and development. At early stages of 
development the government’s role is crucial, and for wthich the capacity of the 
government machinery for formulation and implementation of policies should be 
strengthened. As the country develops, the relative role of market and enterprises 
increases and that of the state should decrease.  
 Secondly, highly populated countries have a better chance of pursuing trade and 
industrial policies on their own; landlocked and smaller countries, which are in proximity 
to each other, may enter industrial collaboration and production sharing and follow joint 
industrial policies. In both cases there is need for a dynamic, flexible and targeted 
industrial policy based on the principle of dynamic, rather than static, comparative 
advantage.  
 Thirdly, the development of a competitive industrial structure also requires 
development of the agricultural sector - where feasible - in order to enhance the supply of 
food, particularly noting that international food prices seem likely to remain high in the 
future. 
 Fourthly, foreign direct investment (FDI) in general, and in export processing 
zones (EPZs) in particular, should be managed, controlled and targeted in order to serve 
the objectives of the industrialization and development of the home country. Control of 
capital flows in general should be a part of long-term development strategy. 
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 Finally, remote Island countries which depend on tourism may consider following 
a policy consisting of foreign reserve management and specialization in various types of 
tourism. For example some may specialize in sports tourism, others in health tourism, 
luxury tourism, academic tourism, etc. Further, they may invest in areas which provide 
backward linkages to the tourism sector such as food processing etc. They may also get 
involve in production sharing in cases where they are in proximity to each other (e.g.  
some Asian Pacific Islands). 
 There are some constraints, imposed through WTO rules, on implementation of 
the industrial policy proposed above, but LDCs still have some room to manoeuvre. They 
should, however, resist further loss of their policy space through the WTO and especially 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). International Financial Institutions also 
should reconsider their policies towards LDCs. The alternative is not only 
underdevelopment, but also the risk of human tragedy, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
countries where the masses of people are facing extreme poverty, AIDS and malnutrition.  
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I. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has led to a widespread and severe global economic crisis, 
which has been unprecedented since the Great Depression started in the late 1920s. 
According to WTO, the volume of world merchandise trade will decline by 9 per cent in 
2009 after its growth rate had declined from 7 per cent, on average, during 2006-07 to 2 
per cent in 2008 (WTO, 2009). The forecast by the IMF is even more on the downside 
predicting a drop of 11 per cent for the volume of world trade in merchandize goods and 
services and 14.6 per cent for their prices. The prices of petroleum and non-fuel primary 
commodities, which are the main exports of LDCs, are predicted to decline by 46.4 per 
cent and 27.9 per cent in 2009 as compared with 2008, in the second half of which the 
prices had already fallen from their peak (IMF, 2009.b). In fact, according to OECD 
during the first quarter of 2009 the volume of imports of G7 countries (industrialized 
countries), which are the main market for LDCs, dropped by 16.8 per cent on a yearly 
basis (OECD, 2009). 
 While all countries, whether developed or developing, have been affected by the 
crisis, least developed countries have been hit, in particularly, hard as they are the 
weakest among the community of nations because of their low capacity to bear the 
related external shocks. They have been vulnerable and fragile due to their weak 
economic structure, high integration into the world economy, dependence on primary 
commodities and foreign financial flows, and in most cases high indebtedness. Further, 
they had to bear the external shock resulting from global depression at the time most of 
them were suffering from the food and fuel crisis. 
Their manufacturing sector in particular is fragile because of its infancy, de-
industrialization resulting from the liberalization of recent decades, and the sector’s lack 
of supply capacity and competitiveness in internal and international markets, where the 
rules of the game on competition have changed. Changes in the global economy - 
including rapid technological change, globalization, new methods of production, trade 
liberalization, and the emergence of China as a massive exporter of labour intensive 
products, have increased the competitive pressure on the manufacturing sector of least 
developed countries. In particular, the clothing industry which account for over two-
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thirds of exports of manufactured goods of LDCs has been hit hard by the competitive 
pressure from Chinese exports. 
 The commodity boom of 2003-08 provided LDCs with an opportunity to boost 
investment and enhance economic growth after decades of slow growth, marginalization 
from the world economy (in terms of their share in world trade) and, in some cases, de-
industrialization. The economic crisis, however, halted their acceleration of growth and 
industrialization. The crisis not only has a detrimental impact on the current economic 
performance of LDCs, but it will also influence the prospects for their industrialization to 
the extent that it affects their investment negatively. The crisis, however, provides a 
wake-up call for LDCs to rethink about their future development, diversification and thus 
trade and industrialization strategies. They should be prepared for the management of 
“boom and bust”, particularly the use of resources during the boom, in case the 
commodity boom re-emerges in the future. 
 To proceed, we will first discuss, in the rest of the following section, the structural 
weakness of LDCs and their vulnerability to external shocks. The third section is devoted 
to explanation of the implications of changes in the global economy and new forms of 
competition for the industrialization of LDCs. Subsequently, in section IV the mechanism 
of transmission of the global financial and economic crisis to LDCs will be taken up and 
assessment will be made of its possible impact on development and industrialization of 
these countries. Section V is allocated to the analysis of short- and long-term strategies 
and policies required for the acceleration of industrialization of LDCs and related 
constraints. The final section will conclude the study. 
 
II: Structural features of LDCs; 
their fragility and vulnerability to external shocks 
1. Main features 
Least developed countries are marginalized in international trade (in terms of their share 
in world trade), particularly trade in manufactured goods. Their low weight in 
international trade, their structural weakness and heavy dependence on foreign trade and 
finance make them extremely vulnerable to external shocks. Their manufacturing sector 
is in particular vulnerable not only because of its infancy, but also because of its reliance 
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on the primary sector for the provision of foreign exchange and sources of income.  
Through its supply effects the primary sector contributes to the supply of imported capital 
goods and intermediate products required for capacity expansion and utilization. Through 
its income effect, exports of primary commodities contribute to generation of domestic 
demand for industrial products. 
 Least developed countries accommodated over 800 million people, i.e. over 12 
per cent of world population in 2007. Yet, they account for less than one  per cent of total 
world trade, about 0.1 per cent and 0.3 per cent of international trade and output of 
manufactured goods in 2007, respectively.1 They are not homogeneous in terms of the 
size of population, structure of production and exports, the degree of integration into the 
world economy, the degree of indebtedness, etc (tables 1 below, and A.1 and A.2, 
annexed at the end). Nevertheless, they are all common in their vulnerability to external 
shocks and their low capacity to take related risks. Such vulnerability is related mainly to 
their structure of production and income which causes a low level of development and 
industrialization as well its related fiscal and balance of payments constraints.  
 
Table 1: 
Main characteristics of various groups of LDCs (2006)** 
 
Exporting 
groups  
No. 
of 
coun-
tries 
Popu-
lation 
(m) 
MVA/ 
GDP(%) 
Exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
Manu-
factured 
exports/ 
Total 
exports 
(%) 
Exports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Imports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
(Export -
Imports)/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Accu-
mulated 
debts/ 
GDP* 
Debt 
service/ 
exports* 
Petroleum & 
natural gas 
8 197.1 5.94 58,894.3 5.55 41.64 32.86 8.78 43.83 5.75 
Other 
Minerals 
9 88.8 8.49 10,699.7 6.48 25.21 36.59 -11.38 66.57 9.09 
Agriculture 10 107 8.48 4,408.9 10.11 25.81 44.90 -19.09 100.76 12.38 
Manufactures 7 209.8 11.60 18,259 68.09 30.64 64.34 -33.69 44.05 5.95 
Services 12 139.4 6.43 3,297 6.66 30.15 57.61 -27.45 85.82 8.97 
Diversified 4 43.5 14.45 3,736 31.50 31.25 42.29 -11.04 54.20 8.23 
All LDCs 50 785.6 9.23 99,294.9 21.40 30.78 46.43 -15.65 65.87 8.40 
 
* 2005 
**. Figures are simple averages so they do not correspond to those of Table 17. 
Source: Table A.1 
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 The majority of LDCs show a low share of manufactured goods in their structure 
of production and exports; for 33 LDCs, the share of MVA in GDP is well below 10 per 
cent and for 30 countries the share of manufactured goods in total exports is also less than 
10 per cent (Tables 2 and 3). In other words, they, particularly African LDCs, are highly 
dependent on production and exports of primary commodities (see Table 18). Even in the 
case of the handful of countries which are referred to as “manufactures exporters”, the 
structure of production and exports is concentrated in one or two labour intensive, low 
technology intensive items. For example, according to the latest available data, in the 
case of Bangladesh, which is the largest exporter of manufactured goods among LDCs, 
textiles and clothing accounted for 44 per cent of MVA in 1995 (Word Bank, WDI, 
2009, table 4.3); and for nearly 95 per cent of its exports of manufactured goods in 2006 
(Based on UNCTAD, 2008, a tables 3.2.D and 3.1).2 Similarly, the readily available data 
for 2003 indicate that exports of textiles and clothing constitute over 85 per cent, 84 per 
cent,70.3 per cent, 51 per cent, 41 per cent, 32 per cent and 32 per cent of total exports of 
Cambodia, Haiti, Lesotho, Nepal, Laos, Madagascar and the Maldives, respectively 
(UNCTAD , 2005, Table 5. Generally speaking textiles and clothing accounts for over 70 
per cent of exports of manufactures from LDCs (UN, COMTRADE database). 
 
2. Fiscal and balance of payments constraints 
The combination of a low level of development and rigid production structure imposes 
both fiscal and balance of payments constraints on most LDCs; in other words, (non-oil) 
primary commodities provide low and unstable sources of the income and foreign 
exchange necessary for investment and industrialization. The average per capita income 
of LDCs in 2006 was US$462.  But when oil exporting countries and Island countries are 
excluded the average reduces to $398 for African LDCs and $339 for Asian ones. 
Furthermore, in the same year 23 countries (22 African and one Asian), out of 35 
(excluding oil exporting countries and Islands), show per capita income of less than $266  
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Table 2: 
Percentage Share of MVA in GDP of LDCs (2005-06) 
 
MVA/GDP 
(per cent) Asia Africa All LDCs 
 No per cent No per cent No per cent 
Less than 5 5 38.5 8 23.5 13 27.7 
5-10 5 38.5 15 44.1 20 42.6 
10-15 - - 7 20.6 7 14.9 
15-20 2 15.4 4 11.8 6 12.8 
20-21 1 7.6 -  1 2.1 
Total 13 100 34 100 47 100 
 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on UNCTAD (2008.b), table 3. 
 
 
Table 3: 
Share of manufactured goods in exports of merchandise goods and 
services of LDCs (2003-05) 
 
Range (per cent) Number of countries  Cumulative 
Less than 3 12 12 
3-5 5 17 
5-10 12 29 
10-15 5 34 
15-20 4 38 
Greater than 20 9 47 
Countries with their share 
greater than 20 per cent 
Senegal (26.6), Samoa (36.9), Laos (32.4), Nepal (47.85), Bhutan 
(47.6), Lesotho (69.3), Cambodia (73), Haiti (70), Bangladesh (80.6)  
 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on UNCTAD (2008.b), Table B. 
Note: Tuvalu and Togo are not included. 
 
a year or $1 a day in the same year.3 At such a low level of income, when the household 
consumption (which is anyhow below subsistence level for many citizens) is deducted 
from per capita income, little is left for financing government expenditure for public 
administration, social services and investment as well as repayments of debts. For 
example, for 28 countries (18 of which are in Africa), the resulting figure is less than 
$100 per capita per year, and for 15 countries it is less than $50 a year.  
 Of course, such a low level of sources of finance available for public 
administration, investment and debt repayments is due to the low level of per capita 
income which is, in turn, a reflection of the low productive capacity of LDCs. The low 
and inflexible productive capacity also causes the balance of payments constraint, with 
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high current account deficits in relation to GDP (table 1) because of the need for imports 
of investment goods, intermediate goods, fuels and such consumer items as foods. As is 
shown in Table 1, with the exception of oil exporting countries, all groups of LDCs, 
particularly manufacture exporting countries, show considerable balance of payments 
deficits in 2006, i.e. before the emergence of the financial crisis. Furthermore, the more 
integrated a production group is in the international economy, in terms of the 
exports/GDP and imports/GDP ratios, particularly the latter, the higher are its current 
account deficits. In other words, there is a direct relation between the degree of LDCs’ 
integration into the world economy, influenced by premature trade liberalization (see 
below) and balance of payments constraints.  
 
3. The food and fuel crisis preceded the global economic crisis 
The food and fuel crisis has contributed to the balance of payments constraints of many 
LDCs before the outbreak of the economic crisis. The available data on imports of food 
and fuels indicates that already in 2002, for 21 LDCs (out of 32 countries for which data 
were available by the World Bank) the share of food and fuel imports was over 50 per 
cent of their total merchandise exports. In fact, 11 of them spent the equivalent of 100 per 
cent of their exports on imports of food and fuel (Karshenas, 2009, figure 10). Since then, 
the food and fuel crisis has absorbed increasing amounts of foreign exchange. For 
instance, on the basis of UNCTA sources in 2006, 36, out of 50 LDCs, were net food 
importers. The explosion of food prices (see below) increased the import food bill of 
these countries by 2.4 times between 2000 and 2006 (based on UNCTAD; 2008.b table 
10 and 30). In 2006, imports of food products were , on average, equal to 72 per cent of 
exports in 19 net food importing LDCs (of which 13 were African). These countries were 
also net importers of agricultural raw materials. In 10 cases4 food imports exceeded 100 
per cent and in another six countries it was between 50 per cent and 100 per cent of total 
merchandise exports. 
 
4. Dependence on external sources of finance 
As a result of fiscal and balance of payments constraints, most LDCs, particularly non-oil 
exporting countries, have to rely heavily on external sources of finance for government 
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expenditure, capital accumulation and imports (table 4).  As LDCs have little 
creditworthiness in the international capital market, they have to finance the current 
account deficits of their balance of payments by official flows, mainly foreign aid. For 
example during 2004-06, official flows (excluding debt relief and grants), FDI and 
private borrowing accounted for 61.8 per cent 35.3 per cent and 2.2 per cent of long-term 
capital flows to LDCs (Based on UNCTAD; LDC Report, 2008.b). The African LDCs, in 
particular, were dependent on foreign aid for financing investment. In 2006, foreign aid 
accounted for over 17 per cent and 10 per cent of GDP of African non-oil exporting 
LDCs and Asian LDCs, respectively. It was equivalent of about 90 per cent and 20 per 
cent of their investment outlays, respectively (Kaeshena, 2008, figures 20 and 21 based 
on World Bank, WDI).  
 
Table 4: 
External resource gap as a percentage of gross domestic investment and 
government consumption expenditure in non-oil exporting LDCs 
 
   Per cent of Gov. expenditure   Per cent of total investment 
   ---------------------------------------  ------------------------------------- 
   2000-04 2004-07  2000-04 2004-07 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
African LDCs  94.1  80.8   94.2  81 
Asian LDCsa  32.1  39.8   29.3  35.5 
Island LDCs  109.1  98   108.9  97.4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Karshenas (2009: Table 4), based on World Bank, WDI 
a: includes Yemen which is an oil exporting country 
 
Table 5: 
Distribution of LDCs according to their degree of indebtedness and access 
to oceans 
 
 Highly indebted Others (not highly indebted) Total 
LDCs 
Memo: 
Total 
landlocked  Total Landlocked Landlocked Not landlocked 
Africa 27 10 1 5 33 11 
Asia 2 2 2 4 8 4 
Islands 2 - - 6 8 - 
Total 31 12 3 15 49 15 
 
Source : Calculated by the author based on (UNCTAD,2008,a) 
Note:   Total LDCs is the sum of columns 1, 3 and 4 
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 The inability to pay back debts easily causes more vulnerability as obtaining 
further loans becomes increasingly difficult; accumulated debts accounted, on average, 
for nearly 66 per cent of GDP of LDCs in 2005. Thus the low level of development and 
shortage of financial resources are aggravated by obligation for payments of debt services 
limits the availability of funds for investment and contributes to the high cost of 
investment, production and exports. As shown in Table 5, 31 countries (mostly African) 
out of 49 LDCs are among highly indebted countries, out of which 12 are also landlocked.  
 High interest rates reflect shortage of funds. High interest rates contribute to high 
costs of production, particularly in the manufacturing sector which usually depends on 
fixed capital formation and variable capital more than other sectors. Out of 42 non-oil 
exporting LDCs, 27 are regarded as high interest rate countries by the World Bank 
(Table 6). High interest rate countries are those with real interest rates higher than 6 per 
cent. Accordingly, various groups of countries (Island, Land-locked and highly indebted 
countries) figure among high interest countries. Nevertheless, the majority (16 out of 27) 
are among highly indebted countries and /or landlocked ones (10 landlocked, out of 
which seven are also highly indebted).  
  
Table 6: 
Interest rates in different LDCs (2004-06). 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interest rates  No. of   
(per cent)  countries Countries in order of interest rate level 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Higher than 20   2  Gambia (I, H), Haiti (I, H) 
15-20 per cent  5  Laos (L), Sao Tome & Principe (I), Angola, Malawi (L, H), 
     Central Af. Rep. (L, H) 
10-15   5  Maldives (I), Mozambique (H), Uganda (L, H), Cambodia, 
     Madagascar (H) 
8-10   6  Bhutan (L), Burundi (L, H), Zambia (L, H), Comoros (I, H), 
    Bangladesh (H), Sierra Leone (H) 
6-8   9  Lesotho (L), Djibouti, Liberia (H), Tanzania (H),   
     Solomon Island (I), Mauritania (H), Rwanda (L, H), 
     Vanuatu (I), Samoa (I) 
Total   27 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2009.b), Table 8; based on World Bank source. 
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 The landlocked countries suffer in addition from the higher cost of transportation 
for their exports and imports, including imported inputs for manufacturing sector, than 
other countries. In addition, imported and exported goods must pass through other 
countries, which themselves are mostly among least developed ones, particularly in 
Africa. Such a transport route involves other disadvantages for production and exports of 
landlocked countries. These disadvantages include administrative burden of transit across 
countries, lack of control over the quality of infrastructure and passage of cargos and 
unreliability of transit transport (Serieux, 2009: 5). In fact, these constraints are, in turn, 
contributory factors to the lower per capita income of landlocked countries than their non 
landlocked neighbouring countries (Ibid: 5-6). Even though they may show higher 
trade/GDP ratios, they suffer from greater volatility in their output and exports (Ibid. 6) 
thus higher risks of production and Investment. 
 Low supply capacity is the main reason for low capacity for exports of 
manufactured goods. The commodity boom of 2003-08 provided an opportunity for the 
expansion of the supply capacity, but it was interrupted by the global economic crisis 
which led to a “bust” as discussed in section IV.  
 
III. Changes in the global economy 
and new forms of competition; implications for industrialization of LDCs 
The development of new methods of production and other changes in the global economy 
during recent decades have increased the competitive pressure on manufactured exports 
of least developed countries. As a result, while the incentive for investment has been 
reduced, its risks have increased. Hence, the need for the provision of government 
support for industrialization in LDCs, particularly through trade and industrial policies, 
has increased. Yet, the means to do so have been constrained. The policy space of 
developing countries has shrunk due to the rapid trade liberalization and other conditions 
imposed on them by international financial institutions, through Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) and Stabilization Programmes (SPs), bilateral trade agreements and 
WTO rules. If the proposals made by the European Union (EU) to impose further 
liberalization measures through EPAs on African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, 
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most of which are least developed, are agreed upon, the industrialization and 
development of these countries will be further sacrificed. 
 
1. New methods of production and competition 
The possibility for entry of new firms of newcomer developing countries into the world 
market has become more complicated in recent years. On the one hand trade 
liberalization through the Uruguay Round, the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) 
arrangement and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in the USA have 
provided new opportunities for exports of LDCs by improving market access to 
developed countries. On the other hand, changes in the rules of the game for competition 
in international markets together with prevailing constraints on the expansion and 
upgrading of supply capacity put competitive pressure on LDCs. In particular, a few main 
developments have taken place making entry of newcomer firms into international 
markets more difficult. These developments include: rapid technological change, increase 
in market concentration and dominance of transnational corporations (TNCs) in 
production and international trade, increases in the scale of production, distribution and 
research and development (R&D) in most industries, globalization, production sharing 
and development of other new methods of production and competition. Furthermore, the 
emergence of China as a massive exporter of labour intensive products puts intense 
competitive pressure on LDCs in the international market for manufactured products of 
interest to least developed counties. 
 The increase in technology intensity of production and distribution and the rapid 
pace of technological change itself contributes to knowledge intensity and the need for a 
larger scale of production in most export activities in the manufacturing sector (Arthur, 
1996). As a result, the process of learning and experience and the need for R&D are 
increased.  
 In fact, to reap economies of scale at the firm level, there has been a significant 
and unprecedented acceleration of mergers and acquisition during recent decades, 
particularly since early this century, as is shown in Table 7.  Furthermore, TNCs have 
been more and more concentrating on specialization in core products in order to benefit 
from scale economies both at the plant and firm levels. Instead of vertical integration 
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within a country they have organized production sharing with other countries through 
their own subsidiaries or in cooperation with other firms. To provide some ideas about 
the scale of firms at the global level, in 2006, the total value of assets of the individual 
companies, among the biggest 100 TNCs ranged from US$50 billion to nearly $700 
billion, as is shown in Table 8. Moreover, their foreign affiliates account for the bulk of 
assets and sales of many TNCs. 
 
Table 7:  
Annual average cross-border mergers and acquisitions with value of more than $1 
billion (1987-2007) 
 
Period     No. of deals   Value ($ billion) 
1987-96    29.3    60.7 
1997-99    107    377.8 
2000-04    127.6    438.2 
2005     182    564.4 
2006     215    711.2 
2007     300    1,161 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.c), Table 1.2. 
 
Table 8: 
Assets and sales of non-financial TNCs in 2006 
 
 
 Ranka 
 
 Firm 
 
 Industry 
 
Assets ($b.) 
Foreign     Total 
 
Sales ($b.) 
Foreign  Total 
 
1 
 
 
10 
 
25 
 
50 
 
75 
 
100 
 
General Electric 
 
 
Wal-Mart 
 
Procter & 
Gamble 
 
Unilver 
 
Metro 
 
Statoil ASA 
 
Electronic 
 
 
Retail 
 
Diversified 
 
Diversified 
 
Retail 
 
Petroleum 
 
442            697 
 
 
110           151 
 
64              138 
 
34              48 
 
23               42 
 
18               50 
 
74            163 
 
 
77            344 
 
44            76 
 
45           49 
 
41            75 
 
16           66 
 
     
 
Source: UNCTAD (2008.c), Table A.l.15 
a By foreign assets in 2006 
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With the presence of TNCs “creative destruction” is a source of competitive process, 
competitive advantage and cumulative change. Competition does not take place on the 
cost of production alone and products are not homogeneous.  The competitive advantage 
of TNCs also depends on their strategic behaviour in gaining and maintaining, or 
improving, their strategic position over time (Porter, 1990; Best, 1990). Globalization 
and the development of new ways of organization of firms have led to new forms of 
competition, putting least developed countries at a disadvantage. Globalization, here, 
refers to the development of global networking in the form of production sharing, 
international consortia, cross licensing agreements and joint ventures (Best, 1990, 260). A 
global firm produces and sells in many nations in order to benefit from economies of 
scale. Moreover, it collaborates with other firms to share activities such as production 
facilities, marketing, distribution, input procurement, product development and design at 
the global level without necessarily investing abroad directly (Ibid, 256-262). Despite 
their strategic alliance, however, collaborating firms also compete in the final market. In 
a world of increasing returns the current behaviour of established firms affects not only 
the current, but also future, situation of newcomer firms in the same industry (Young, 
1928). 
 In such a Schumpeterian world, the established large firms pursue an innovative 
strategy which relies on large fixed investment, knowledge, new technology, skilled 
labour and organizational capabilities and experience (Lazonic, 1991). Firms of least 
developed countries do not have such privileges and capabilities, thus they need to follow 
“an adaptive strategy” by relying on low costs of production emanating from factor cost 
advantages (cheap labour). As they are factor driven, the firms of least developed 
countries, particularly the newcomers, face less “productive uncertainty” (related to the 
internal operation of a firm). Nevertheless, they face more “competitive uncertainty”, 
thus risks, than the established firms of developed and developing countries which are 
their actual or potential rivals in the international market. 
 Flexible specialization is another form of new organization of firms for 
competition. In globalization firms compete mainly on strategic behaviour and cost of 
production through production sharing and networking, economies of scale and mass 
production. In flexible specialization the emphasis is placed on innovation and rapid 
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adaptation to changes in the market. Here, firms compete mainly on differentiated 
products, speedy production and delivery time and cost reduction through capacity 
utilization by employing multi-use equipments and skilled manpower. In flexible 
specialization firms may also collaborate with each other through clustering (UNIDO, 
2008), regional conglomeration, federated enterprises and technological alliance. While 
there are some differences between the two methods, there are also some similarities. 
Integration through globalization requires, inter alia, large amounts of capital, 
sophisticated technology and strategic planning. Flexible specialization requires 
sophisticated technology, highly skilled labour and strategic thinking.  In both cases 
knowledge and experience are important due to the need for sophisticated technology, 
strategic action/thinking and/or high skills.  
 Hence, the process of learning can be prolonged and become more costly due to 
these new forms of competition in addition to other reasons mentioned above. Moreover, 
in both cases attempts for networking and collaboration usually take place among 
established firms. As a result of the combination of rapid technological change, increased 
scale of production, globalization, and the resultant rapid changes in the conditions of 
competition, the late-comer firms and countries are at a disadvantageous position for 
penetrating the international market in terms of cost, learning period, skill and 
organizational capabilities, the period of infancy, and the risk of success in the expansion 
of supply capacities. The contribution of FDI to capacity building is also limited by 
domestic capabilities Even when a newcomer enters the international market for some 
labour intensive products, with or without the assistance of TNCs, it will have serious 
constraints for upgrading its industrial structure, as indicated by the case of Bangladesh 
and other “manufacture exporting” LDCs. 
 The greater risks involved imply that newcomer firms should be provided with 
greater rewards than what would be provided by the market. Such rewards can be 
provided by the government by taking measures which contribute to increasing the profit 
margin of infant firms through reduction in their costs or through increases in their 
revenue per unit of output. These measures may include a combination of investment in 
activities which provide external economies to the manufacturing firms and policies, 
particularly trade and industrial, which provide them with incentives.  
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 In practice, there are constraints on both. Investment in infrastructure, education 
and training, back-up services, R&D and technological development and provision of 
information on external markets, marketing channels etc. are examples of activities which 
provide externalities to the firms. Such investment, however, requires significant 
financial resources which are lacking in LDCs. More importantly, conditionalities 
imposed on LDCs through SAPs and SPs reduce government revenue from trade taxes 
and limit their public expenditures because of the pressure to limit budget deficits. The 
global economic crisis is also an additional detrimental factor for government budgets. 
Similarly, the incentive to invest has decreased during recent decades since the early 
1980s due to the premature, universal and across-the-board trade liberalization imposed 
on LDCs through those programmes, or through the WTO or bilateral trade agreements. 
And WTO rules have also imposed costs of compliance, putting further financial pressure 
on LDCs. 
 
2. Costs of compliance with WTO rules  
Least developed countries also suffer from high costs of compliance with WTO rules, 
some of which also contribute to increasing the costs of production and upgrading their 
production structures. Such costs are related to their obligations under TRIPs (Agreement 
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) and other international agreements on 
intellectual property rights (e.g. the World Intellectual Property Organization), which are 
sometimes aggravated by bilateral free trade agreements (Smith, 2008). TRIPs restricts 
the application and transfer of technology to developing countries as it renders patents 
protected for 20 years. The use of technology through licensing, even when awarded, 
involves high costs in the form of royalty payments. Technology for production of most 
light manufactured goods is embodied in capital equipment and is available through 
purchase of machinery. Nevertheless, the application of technology and penetration into 
international markets need knowledge and experience which are lacking in least 
developed countries. Moreover, the technology for the upgrading of the industrial 
structure is not freely available due to restrictions imposed by intellectual property rights. 
The implementation of a number of WTO agreements is highly costly and requires both 
physical and skills development. According to one estimate, the costs of implementation 
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of “just three WTO Agreements [Customs Valuation, Sanitary & Phytosanitary 
Regulations and TRIPs ] of the six Uruguay Round Agreements that involve restructuring 
of domestic regulations, come to about $150 million [in 2000 prices]….. [which] is more 
than the annual development budget for eight of twelve least developed countries for 
which we could find a figure for that part of the budget”.5 
 Of course, meanwhile a newcomer firm, in theory, enjoys a lower cost of 
obtaining the necessary inputs and intermediate goods from the international market due 
to trade liberalization. In practice, however, this would depend on the availability of the 
foreign exchange which in turn would depend, inter alia, on the supply capabilities of the 
country for the expansion of exportables, which is affected by premature liberalization 
negatively as will be shortly explained. But the risk of investment in the supply expansion 
for exports and upgrading has also increased because of the fierce competition by China 
in the international market.  
 
3. The emergence of China 
The emergence of China has intensified competition in the international market for 
manufactured goods including labour intensive products, which are of interest to LDCs for a 
number of reasons. First, the relative magnitude of exports of manufactured goods of China 
in relation to exports of other developing countries is significant, particularly when Hong 
Kong is included (Table 9). In 2006, exports of manufactured goods of China alone were 
over 50 times greater than exports of these goods from LDCs as a whole. Secondly, such a 
magnitude was achieved as China accelerated its exports of manufactured goods to an 
annual average growth rate of over 26 per cent during 2000-06 (Table 10). In 2006, 
manufactured goods accounted for over 92 per cent of the total exports of China. 
 Thirdly, light manufactured goods, which are mainly labour intensive, account for 
significant part (nearly 44 per cent) of exports of manufactured goods of China, the pace of 
which also accelerated sharply during 2000-06 (Table 10). China’s exports of textiles and 
clothing, which are the LDCs’ main manufacturing exports, as mentioned before, have 
particularly accelerated during recent years due to the removal of quota restrictions through 
the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) (Table 11). 
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Table 9: 
Export of manufactured goods of China and Hong Kong as a percentage of exports 
of manufactured goods of various groups (2006) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      China   China plus Hong Kong 
World       10.8   14.4  
Developing countries    31.7   42.4 
Developing countries excluding China 42.3   56.4 
Developing countries ex. China &HK 49.2   65.7  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: based on UNCTAD (2008.a, Table 3.1). 
 
 
Table 10:  
Importance of manufactured goods in total exports of China (2006) 
 
       Average annual growth rate of 
Exports (2006)  exports (per cent)   
   ------------------------------ --------------------------------------------- 
Products:   Value ($ bn)  Share (%) 1995-2000 2000-06 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Light manufactureda 392.4  40.5  8.2  21.1   
Total manufactured 893.4  92.2  12  26.3 
Total exports  969  100  10.8  25.4   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
a: SITC 6+8-(667+168)  
Sources: As Table 9 
 
Finally, while assembly operations still constitute the bulk of industrial plants of China, the 
country has also developed the capabilities of domestic firms in production of a number of 
technology intensive products (Gallaher and Shafaeddin, 2009). In other words, the 
country is pioneering in upgrading its industrial structure by rapid increases in the value 
added in production and exports of technology intensive goods. Therefore, LDCs are not 
only facing severe competition from China in international markets for clothing and other 
light manufactured goods, but also will be subject to fierce competition in case they attempt 
 23
to upgrade their structure of exports. As a result, their risks of investment in these activities 
have increased for this as well as the other reasons mentioned earlier. Yet their policy space 
to cover their risks has decreased due to the premature trade liberalization imposed on them.  
Table 11:  
China’s trade in textiles and clothing (1992-2008) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------  
Product       Value ($ bn)  Average annual growth rate 
   -------------------------    ---------------------------------- 
   1992 2000 2008  1992-2000 2000-08 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exports 
 Textiles 9.4 17.2 67.3  6.2  20.4 
 Clothing 16.8 36.1 120  9.2  18.7 
Imports 
 Textiles 9.7 14.4 20.1  4.9  6.1   
 Clothing 0.4 1.2 2  12.8  6.3 
Net trade (exports minus imports) 
 Textiles -0.3 2.8 42.1  -  40.3 
 Clothing 16.4 34.9 118  9.9  16.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Calculated by the author based on UN Comtrade database 
  
4. Trade liberalization and de-industrialization 
 i. De-industrialization 
Since the early 1980s, the dominant economic philosophy and strategy of international 
financial institutions vis-à-vis developing countries has changed in favour of market-
oriented development, trade liberalization and export-oriented industrialization. Since 
then many LDCs have been de-industrialized. 
 LDCs are at the early stages of industrialization. One would expect, based on the 
experience of other countries (Chenery and Syrqin, 1985), that the share of MVA in 
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their GDP should have increased during the last couple of decades. In previous studies we 
have shown that premature trade liberalization during the 1980s and early 1990s was 
accompanied with the de-industrialization of most LDCs (Shafaeddin, 1995 and 1996).  
For the following period during which trade liberalization has been intensified de-
industrialization has been also intensified. Taking the MVA/GDP ratio as an indicator of 
the degree of industrialization, Table 12 indicates that on average the ratio has declined 
between 1990 and 2006, influenced mainly by the performance of African LDCs. 
Nevertheless, the average figures provided in Table 12 for Asia are misleading as they 
are it is heavily influenced by the performance of Bangladesh, Cambodia and Laos. When 
these countries are excluded the share of Asian LDCs declines from 12.9 per cent in 1990 
to 10 per cent in 2006. Furthermore, de-industrialization seems more pronounced in 
countries which are, relatively speaking, at earlier stages of industrialization. Thus 36 per 
cent of countries which show decrease in MVA/GDP ratios, over the same period, figure 
among those with MVA/GDP ratios of less than 10 per cent in 2005-6 (based on Table 12 
and 13). According to the same table the corresponding figure for countries which show 
an increase in the ratio is 29 per cent. Yet more, out of 24 countries which do not show a 
decline two countries show no change (Eritrea, Sao Tome and Principe) and 14 countries 
depict marginal changes of 0.1 per cent (Djibouti,Ethiopia, Gambia, Haiti and 
Madagascar), 0.2 per cent (Guinea and Togo), 0.3 per cent (Somalia and Sudan) and 0.6 
per cent to 0.9 per cent (Uganda, Tanzania and the Yemen). Such small changes during 
more than a decade cannot be regarded as progress in industrialization.  
 The increases in the MVA/GDP ratio cannot be necessarily attributed to trade 
liberalization either. Countries with noticeable increases in MVA/GDP include in order 
of increase in the ratios Cambodia (10.6 per cent), Equatorial Guinea (9.3 per cent) 
Mozambique (8.5 per cent), Liberia (8.1 per cent), Laos (5.4 per cent), Afghanistan (4.7 
per cent), Myanmar (1.8 per cent), Bangladesh (1.5 per cent):  Nevertheless, with the 
exceptions of Equatorial Guinea and the last two countries, all the others are special cases 
which had suffered from low capacity utilization at the initial period due to war or 
internal conflict rather than the expansion of production capacity. Equatorial Guinea 
enjoyed expansion of oil revenues and the increases in the ratios for Bangladesh and  
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Table 12:  
Changes in the share of MVA in GDP of LDCsa (1990-2006) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LDCs   Other developingb 
 -------------------------------------------  ----------------------------- 
Year All Asia Africa   Islands  All Major exporters 
   & Haiti    of manufactured goods  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1990 10.5 12.1 9.7  6.1  22.5  25.6 
2000 10.2 13.2 7.7  6.4  23.2  27.1 
2006 9.8 13.8 7.5  6.4  24  28.5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Based on UNCTAD,2008.a, Table 8.3.2  
 
a: all variables are in current terms 
b: 10.7 for 1980. 
c. Excludes  LDCs 
 
 
Table 13:  
Changes in the share of MVA in GDP of LDCs (2005-06) 
 
MVA/GDP: 
per cent 
Asia Africa All LDCs 
Increased Decreased Increased Decreased Increased Decreased 
Less than 5 - 5 5 3 5 8 
5-10 3 2 7 8 10 10 
10-15 - - 4 3 4 3 
15-20 2 - 2 2 4 2 
20-21 1 - - - 1 - 
Total 6 7 18 16 24 23 
Per cent in total 
No. for each region 46 54 53 47 51 49 
 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on UNCTAD, 2008.b, Table 3 
 
Myanmar are small. In fact, if the ratios for 2006 are compared with those of 1980, it  
declined slightly in the case of Myanmar and remained the same for Bangladesh 
(UNCTAD, LDCs, 2008, b, Annex table 5).  
 Generally speaking, the degree of de-industrialization will be revealed further if 
one compares the MVA/GDP ratios for 2006 with 1980, 25 out of 40 countries for which 
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data are readily available show declines in the ratios, and two cases show no change 
(Based on op. cit). Again, the exceptional cases mentioned above figure in the list of 
countries where the ratio has gone up. The results of comparison with the 1970s will be 
even more dramatic (see also Sundaram and Arvin, 2008: table 7 and Shafaeddin, 1995 
for comparison with 1970s).  
 The decline in the MVA/GDP ratios in more recent years is partly statistical 
because of the increases in price of fuel and other primary commodities. Nevertheless, the 
increase in the price of primary commodities cannot explain the decline in the ratios 
entirely. Even during 1990s, when the prices of petroleum and other commodities showed 
a declining trend, the MVA/GDP ratios of LDCs declined. 
 
ii. Trade liberalization 
While a number of factors, including structural weaknesses, may have contributed to de-
industrialization, the influence of premature liberalization cannot be denied (Shafaeddin, 
2006.c). During the last two decades, quantitative trade restrictions have been eliminated 
almost entirely or converted to tariffs and tariff levels have been reduced drastically. 
Table 14 provides data on simple average tariff rates for a number of LDCs for which 
comparative data are readily available for 1987 and 2006. Accordingly, in all cases tariffs 
on imports of manufactures have been reduced drastically, ranging from 33.5 per cent to 
83.2 per cent. Furthermore, in the majority of cases the reduction has been more 
pronounced for manufactures than for all imported products. More importantly, all the 
countries shown in the table, with the exceptions of Bangladesh, Burkina and Sudan are 
among those whose MVA/GDP ratios declined in 2006 as compared with 1980. In the 
case of Bangladesh it has not changed and in the other two cases it dropped during 1990-
2006 (Based on table 11 and UNCTAD, 2008.b, Annex table 5). 
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Table14: 
Changes in simple average applied tariff rates of LDCs 1987-2006 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              Total       Manufactures 
    ---------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Countries   1987  2006  per cent reduction 1987b  2006  per cent  reduction  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bangladesh   81.8  14.9  81.7   91.3  15.3  83.2 
Burkina Faso   60.8  12.2  79.9   57.9  12  79.2 
Sudan    56.6  17.4   69.2   56.4  18.4  67.3 
Benin    37.4  13.4   64.1   38.3  12  68.7 
Central African Republic 32  18.7  41.6   33  17.7a  46.3 
Burundi   37  14.65  60.4   32.6  3.3  89.9 
Tanzania   32.1  12.52  61   31.1  11.9  61.7 
Zambia   29.9  14.59   51.2   29.1  13.2a  54.6 
Sierra Leon   25.8  13.6  47.3   28c  13.1  53.2 
Nepal    22.6  13.1  42   26.7c  12.5  53.1 
Mozambique   15.6  12.69   18.7   15.3  11.7  23.5 
Malawi   16.7  12.88   22.9   19.2  13.4  30.2 
Dem. Rep. of Congo  22.4  12  46.4   22.3  11.9  45.4 
Yemen    16.2  7.1  56.1   15.6  6.1  60.8 
Uganda   19.9  12   39.6   17.9  11.9  33.5 
----------------------- 
a.2005    b. or the nearest year    c: 1984-87 
Sources: Calculated by the author based on UNCTAD (1989), various country tables, and UNCTAD (2008.a), Table 4.3, 
UNCTAD (2008.b), and WTO, ITC, UNCTAD (2007). 
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iii. Changes in investment 
De-industrialization during the last couple of decades has taken place despite the 
acceleration of the rate of growth of MVA and investment in more recent years, which 
was prompted mainly by the commodity boom. Trade liberalization and structural 
adjustment were in LDCs during 1980s was accompanied with negative growth in 
investment and a sharp fall in investment/GDP ratios for LDCs as a whole during the 
1980s. In 2006, the average I/GDP ratio for LDCs as a whole exceeded that of 1980, 
including particularly in the case of African LDCs (table 15). Nevertheless, for 
individual countries the ratios for 2006 were lower than those for 1980 in 15 out of 33 
countries (or 30 countries) when three oil exporters are excluded) in the case of African 
LDCs and 4 out of 13 cases in Asian LDCs (Table 16). Furthermore in all cases, the 
expansion of MVA and investment was interrupted by the global economic crisis. 
 
Table 15: 
Indicators of investment 1980-2006 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Share in GDP (per cent)       Annual average  growth rates 
 ------------------------------------------  ------------------------------------------- 
 1980 1990 2000 2006 2007  1980s 1990s 2000-05 2006  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Africa 19.3 15.3 18.6 21.2 20.3  -0.8 6.1 9.6  13.9 
Asia 22.4 15.7 21.7 23.7 23.1  0.3 9.7 10.6  11.9 
Island 30.3 33 22.8 32.5 30.67  3.8 3 9.9  13.1 
Total 20.5 15.6 20 22.2 21.19  -0.4 7.5 10  13.0 
----------------------------------------------- 
Source: UNCTAD (2008.a: Table 8.3.2), and UNCTAD (2008.b: Table 6) and UNCTAD 
database 
 
 In short, trade liberalization has not been accompanied by growth of the industrial 
sector in most LDCs. In fact, de-industrialization has occurred in many of these countries; 
and the recovery in MVA was interrupted by the outbreak of global economic crisis. 
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Table 16: 
Changes in investment/GDP ratios over 1980-2006  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  increased decreased total 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Africa  18 (15) 15  33 (30) 
Asia  9  4  13 
Total  27   19  46 (43) 
As per cent 58.7   41.3  100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Based on UNCTAD, 2008b, Annex Table 6. 
 
 
IV. Transmission of the global economic crisis: impact assessment 
1. The mechanism of transmission 
The main characteristics of LDCs explained in the second section provide some clues to 
the mechanism of transmission of the global economic crisis to their economies. The 
direct transmission of the global financial crisis to LDCs has been limited as they are not 
particularly integrated into the world financial market6. The main financial effects are 
through the reduced availability and increased cost of trade financing, and reduced 
financial flows to LDCs and difficulties in debt services. However, as the financial crisis, 
which started in 2007, led to the global economic crisis, LDCs, like other developing 
countries, were affected with a lag. Transmission of the financial crisis to the economies 
of LDCs in general and their manufacturing sector in particular, has taken place basically 
through real effects of the global economic crisis.  
 The recent global economic crisis, when envisaged in conjunction with the other 
aforementioned factors, has serious implications for the industrialization of LDCs beyond 
temporary losses because of its negative influence on investment thus productive capacity, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. The impact of the global economic crisis is not 
exactly the same on all LDCs as they have different characteristics, as outlined above. 
For example, on the basis of information provided by the IMF, landlocked countries are 
 30
on average more vulnerable than other comparable low-income countries to external 
factors such as trade, FDI, aid and remittances. Nevertheless, generally speaking, there 
are both direct and indirect impacts on the industrial development of these countries. 
They constrain the industrialization and development of LDCs mainly through the 
balance of payments and fiscal impacts. The loss of exports is an obvious direct impact 
on the manufacturing sector. One indirect effect is due to the loss of domestic demand as 
a result of the loss in GDP. Another is the impact on the supply of manufactured goods, 
and particularly on investment for development of future supply capacities 
The fall in commodity prices and export volumes, workers’ remittances and 
financial flows lead on the one hand to a fall, inter alia, in the government revenue and 
expenditure, employment and GNI, and thus domestic demand. On the other hand, they 
reduce the availability of the financial resources and foreign exchange necessary for 
investment in productive capacity and for imports of intermediate products required for 
the utilization of existing capacity. In some cases FDI has been important; the decline in 
FDI is another factor limiting investment. 
The impact on the supply of industrial goods and investment does not stop there. 
The rise in domestic interest rates due to the lack of financial resources, the rise in the 
price of imported inputs, in some cases the fall in exports and financial flows has 
necessitated devaluation of the exchange rate, which will increase the costs of production 
and the cost of capital goods necessary for investment. The increase in the cost of 
servicing foreign debts (in terms of local currency) due to devaluation is another 
constraining factor which limits resources available for investment in physical production 
capacity, education and human capital formation. Even the available resources may not 
be allocated to productive investment by the private sector due to the increased risks and 
uncertainty created by the external shock. Decision making for investment by the private 
investors will be also affected negatively by uncertainties related to the impact of further 
trade liberalization through EPA. The reduction in foreign aid and the increased cost of 
borrowing will be two other detrimental factors. 
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2. Evidence  
It is too early to be able to provide comprehensive data necessary for factual analysis of 
the transmission of the crisis to LDCs. Nevertheless, there are some indications of its 
severe influence on the economic development and industrialization of these countries. 
Let us say a few words on the direct impact of the financial crisis itself before turning to 
its impact through global economic crisis. 
 
i. Trade financing 
The reduced availability and increased cost of trade financing affect production and trade 
negatively through their impact on foreign trade, particularly imports of intermediate 
goods. Opening letters of credit by African banks has been affected negatively by 
problems of matching lines of credit in larger international banks, which restricted their 
credit facilities. Although there is no readily available information on the extent of the 
credit squeeze, there are indications that obtaining trade financing facilities has become 
difficult for LDCs. For example a survey of 26 financial institutions involved in trade 
financing in Africa indicated that “the global crisis was hindering activity in their local 
markets” (AfDB, 2009.b). The manufacturing sector must have suffered from problems 
of trade financing more than the primary sector for three main reasons. First, the 
manufacturing sector depends on imported inputs more than the primary sector and most 
of the requirements for trade financing originate from importers. Second, the international 
banks have reduced the size and the amount of credit lines for trade financing, 
particularly for exports to LDCs where greater risk is involved (AfDB, 2009.c). Thirdly, 
the international trade in primary commodities is usually more dominated by TNCs than 
manufacturing products.  TNCs rely more on their own financial resources than other 
trading firms. In fact, the increase in the risk premium increased the cost of trade 
financing in Africa (AfDB, 2009.a: 5). The spread of the JP Morgan Emerging Countries 
Equity Index reached its highest level since 2002, increasing by 800 basis points in 
October 2008 (Ibid : 5). 
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ii.  Impact through foreign trade 
As LDCs are highly integrated into the world economy, particularly through imports as 
indicated by the exports/GDP and imports/GDP ratios (Table 17), the impact of the crisis 
on their economies will be significant as the crisis will worsen their current account 
deficits. A reduction in exports not only directly influences the GDP through its income 
effects, but also indirectly through its supply effect as export revenue provides means of 
importing products from abroad which cannot be produced domestically. Such products 
consist not only of consumer items, but also intermediate goods and capital equipment 
necessary for the operation and expansion of production capacities, including production 
capacity in the industrial sector. 
    
Table 17 
Trade/GDP and balance of payments/GDP ratios of LDCs and other 
developing                               countries (2006), in percentages 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Exports + Exports - 
Group    Exports/ Imports/ imports)/ imports/ 
    GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Non-oil exporting LDCs: 
 Landlocked  21.2  43.7  64.9  -22.5   
 All   8.1  49.4  77.5  -21.3 
Oil exporting LDCs  41.6  42.6  84.2  -1 
All LDCs   30.8  46.4  77.2  -15.6 
Developing countries exc. 
LDCs   44.3  38.6  82.9  +6.3 
Oil exporting developing 
countries   56.1  32.6  88.7  +23.5  
---------------- 
Source: Based on Table A.1   Note. Figures are simple averages 
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Table 17.a: 
Trade /GDP ratios for various groups of LDCs (2006): % 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
          Change 
Regions         in total 
   Exports  Imports  Total    (1990-2006) 
Africa    38.2  36.2  74  23.7 
Asia    27.4  37  64.7  42.6 
Islands    45.5  68.4  110.3  0.6 
All LDCs   34.7  36.8  71.5  29 
Dev. Countries exc. LDCs 44.4  38.6  83  29.1 
------------------------------------------------     
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.a) 
Note: The data do not correspondend with Table 17, which is based on simple averages. 
iii. Commodity prices 
As mentioned earlier, most LDCs depend heavily on the production and export of 
primary commodities (see also Table 18). Thus a fall in international commodity prices 
is an important channel of transmission of the shock created by the global economic crisis. 
International commodity prices are demand-determined; changes in demand for 
commodities are reflected mainly in price rather than volume. The recent boom in 
commodity prices of 2003-08 “has been the most marked of the past century in its 
magnitude, duration, and the number of commodity groups whose prices have increased” 
(World Bank, 2009: p.3 and chart 1.a. The boom in commodities was, however, followed 
by a “bust” which has been also the most serious during the last four decades (IMF, 
2009.b, p. 46, table 1.2). 
 
Table 18 
Structure of merchandized exports of LDCs (2005-06): % 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group  Fuel Other   Total             Manufactured 
   Primary Primary Total     of which light 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Africa  63.7 27.9  91.6  8  7.3 
Asia  28.4 15.7  44.1  55.3  53 
All LDCs 52.7 24.3  77.0  22.4  20 
--------------------------- 
Sources: Based on UNDCTAD, LDC Report 2008, tables 8and 9 
 
 34
The boom 
The commodity boom of 2003-08 (Table 19, and Charts 1and 2) facilitated the 
acceleration of growth of GDP and the supply capacity for production of manufactured 
goods of LDCs by providing foreign exchange and sources of finance for investment. As 
is shown in Table 20, during 2000-06, LDCs could in fact catch up with other developing 
countries in their rate of growth of MVA. During this period, they managed to utilize 
their commodity windfall better than on previous occasions.  Their performance in 
investment was impressive in 2006, for which data are available, as compared with 2000-
02; the boom provided an impetus for the acceleration of investment by increasing 
savings and reducing the resource gap (Table 21). 
 
 
 
Table 19: 
Percentage changes in commodity price indices (2000=100) 
Commodities 1990-2000 
2002 to the 
monthly peak 
in 2008* 
Monthly peak 
to monthly 
trough* 
Mineral ores and metals -21.2 351.4 -50.7 
Veg. oils and oil seeds -6.5 217.4 -53.1 
Agricultural raw materials -23.2 144.1 -41.4 
Food -20.2 157.3 -27.7 
Tropical beverages  -7.1 117.5 -20.7 
Total non-oil -19.5 148.9 -36.3 
Petroleum -28        287 -68.7 
 
Sources: UNCTAD (2008.a), Table 6.1 and Commodity Price Bulletin online. 
* For the commodities as a whole and for minerals the peak was April 2008 and for the 
rest it was June 2008. The monthly trough was February 2009 for the whole basket and 
for minerals, March 2009 for agricultural raw materials and December 2008 for the rest. 
The related figures for 2002 are yearly averages. 
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Table 20: 
 Annual average growth rates of GDP and MVA of  LDCs (1980-2007) 
 
Country Groups  1980-90 1990-2000 2000-2006 2007 
Africa & Haiti 1.9 3.4 6.4 8.6 
Asia 2.9 5.1 6.8 6.2 
Islands 4.4 4.3 4.0 5.0 
    Total LDCs 2.2 4.0 6.5 7.6 
MVA: 
Africa& Haiti 1.9 2.4 6.8 7.8 
Asia 2.9 6.6 8.0 4.1 
Islands 5.7 4.0 2.1 5.7 
    Total LDCs 4.2 4.2 7.4 5.9 
Other developing 5.2 6.8 7.4 8.3 
 
Source: Based on UNCTAD , Based on UNCTAD,  
Handbook of Statistics various issues, UNCTAD ( 20008.b) and IMF, WEO,2009. 
 
Table 21: 
Savings and investment - GDP ratios and resource gaps of LDCs (2000-06) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     2000-02  2006 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Gross Domestic Savings (S)  12.8   20.7 
Gross capital formation (I)  19.8   22.2 
Resource gap (S-I)    -7    -1.6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.b), Table 3. 
 
 
The bust 
As is shown in Table 19 and charts 2 and 3, the commodity boom of 2003-08 ended in 
the second quarter of 2008 after a lag following the financial crisis which had started in 
December 2007. From the peak (April 2008) to the trough (February 2009), non-oil 
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commodity prices, in terms of the US dollar, fell on average by 36 per cent. The peak to 
the trough drop in petroleum prices was even more significant. As expected, non-oil 
primary products which have industrial uses (minerals and agricultural raw materials) 
were hit harder than other products; vegetable oils and oilseeds are exceptions. The 
demand for vegetable oils has increased during recent years as it has become a source of 
manufacturing bio-fuel in addition to their use in the chemical industry.  
 Changes in the prices of food products are of special interest to LDCs, the 
majority of which (36 out of 50) are net food importers, as mentioned earlier. While food 
prices increased by over 157 per cent in June 2008 as compared with the average in 2002, 
they show the second smallest drop in prices between that date and the trough in 
December 2008. After that, the relevant index increased by 14 per cent to the end of June 
2009, as against 10 per cent on average for all commodities. 
 The falls in price of various groups of commodities affect the economic 
performance of exporting countries, particularly their manufacturing sectors, in different 
ways. In the case of minerals, particularly petroleum, the bulk of export revenues accrue 
to the government. The reduction in government revenues and expenditure affects the rest 
of the economy directly and through multiplier effects. Usually, what is axed as a result 
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Chart 1b
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of the reduction in government revenue is investment in infrastructure and productive 
sectors, which has long-term implications for industrialization and development. The 
reduction in the price of agricultural raw materials and food (where a country is a food 
exporter) changes the income of the producers and traders directly, affecting the pattern 
of consumption of households against manufactured goods under the influence of 
“Engel’s Law”.  Accordingly, expenditures on foods and other necessities would benefit 
from a sort of “ratchet effect”. The fall in workers’ remittances will also have direct 
detrimental effects on domestic demand for manufactures.  
 
iv. Workers’ remittances, tourism and domestic demand for manufactures 
While a decline in commodity prices has indirect effects on domestic demand for 
manufactured goods, a fall in workers’ remittances influences it directly as mentioned 
above. A number of “manufacturer exporters” are significant recipients of workers’ 
remittances. Hence, the detrimental impact of a reduction in remittances on domestic 
demand for manufactured goods adds to the fall in their external demands leading to low 
capacity utilization, unemployment and a negative influence on investment in productive 
capacity. 
 Workers’ remittances accruing to LDCs have been growing fast during recent 
years (Table 22); they have becoming nearly as important as exports of manufactured 
goods for the LDCs as a whole. For some countries, they were, in fact, equivalent to, or 
greater than, their total exports in 2007 (Table 23). As the economic situation in the host 
countries deteriorates, and expatriate workers become unemployed, remittances to their 
home countries drop. According to an estimate by the World Bank, the remittances will 
decline by over 4per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia and Pacific 
(htt://blogs.worldbank.org/files/peoplemove/files/table 1-remit-flow). 
 In LDCs the average income of the families whose source of income is 
remittances is often higher than the average family income of workers who are engaged 
in the domestic sector or are unemployed. Therefore, they usually spend a higher 
proportion of their income on manufactured goods and the purchase of residential units 
than others (e.g. Sri Lanka,).  Hence, the reduction in remittances directly affects not only 
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domestic demand for manufactured products, but also construction activities with a 
negative impact on employment, and thus further reduction in demand. 
Table 22 
Changes in workers’ remittances received by LDCs (2000-07) 
 
    African  Asian  Island  Total 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Value (US$ bn): 
2000      2.9    3.6  0.2    6.7 
2007      6.4  10.1  0.2  16.7 
Average annual growth rate, 
(2000-07)   11.9  15.8  0  13.93 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators online 
 
 
Table 23  
Workers remittance as a percentage of exports (2007) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Countries 
Per cent   --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
of exports  No.   Names 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
100 or more  6 Gambia, Liberia, Haiti, Nepal, Comoros, Kiribati  
50-70   4 Sao Tome, Uganda, Bangladesh, Senegal 
30-50   7 Djibouti, Lesotho, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Vanuatu,  
    Benin, Togo 
10-20   9 Yemen, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Solomon  
    Islands, Niger, Cambodia 
Less than 10  5 Burkina Faso, Samoa, Guinea, Mozambique, Myanmar 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators online 
 
 It is predicted that a number of manufacturer exporters would be hit severely by 
the decline in remittances. In 2007, workers’ remittances were equivalent to over 100 per 
cent of total exports in the cases of Nepal and Haiti (and 200 per cent and 143 per cent of 
their manufactured exports, respectively), 50 per cent in the case of Bangladesh (62 per 
cent of its manufactured exports), 52 per cent in the case of Senegal (about 200 per cent 
of its manufactured exports) and over 45 per cent in the case of Lesotho (65 per cent of 
its manufactured exports).7  To emphasize the importance of the figures note that for 
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example, in 2008, workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP reached over 27 per cent 
in the case of Lesotho, and 18 per cent, 17.8 per cent and 11 per cent in the cases of Haiti, 
Nepal and Bangladesh, respectively. According to the IMF, in all these cases, except for 
Lesotho for which data are not available, the projected fall in the remittances in 2009 is 
significant, Based on IMF (2009.a) for example the difference between the projection 
undertaken in 2009 and 2008 reaches 3 per cent of GDP in the case of Haiti (IMF; 
2009.a.:Appendix table V). 
 Before ending this section, let us also mention that tourism is the main source of 
exports of services on which a number of LDCs depends, particularly Islands. Tourism is 
highly income elastic, thus it is usually sharply affected by global economic downturns. 
A fall in revenues from tourism affects, in particular, demand for food processing 
industries directly. Further, it affects demand for manufactured goods indirectly through 
its impact on the income of employees of the sector, which is labour intensive. 
Unfortunately, no data is available on the projection of the demand on tourism of LDCs, 
but one would expect it would be significant.  
 
v.  Impact on the current account 
The combination of the decline in exports of goods and services and in remittances will 
have a significant detrimental effect on the current account of LDCs, both in relation to 
their imports as well as GDP as is shown in Table 24. According to the same Table 
African LDCs and the Island countries are much worse affected than Asian LDCs. 
The main reason for such a differential impact is the reliance of Africa and Islands 
on exports of primary commodities and services (tourism), respectively. Table 25 
provides data on projections of the current account of the balance of payments for 
individual LDCs. Accordingly, the mineral and service (mainly tourism) exporters 
(mainly Islands) are worst hit by the external shock as judged by the projected deficits in 
their current accounts. Ten of the 16 countries with current account deficits/GDP ratios of 
greater than 10 per cent are petroleum, mineral or service exporters. These products not 
only have shown greater price declines in international markets, but they will be also 
worse hit as far as their volume of exports is concerned.  Minerals, as well as agricultural 
raw materials, are inputs to industrial activities which have been more severely affected  
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Table 24     
Current account of balance of payments of LDCs and 
their projections for 2008-09*   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Groups 
 
2000 
 
2007 
2008 2009 
projections 
Value in million dollars 
Africa and Haiti -9,103.6 -6,996.2 -4,885.1 -31,842.2 
Asia 508.8 -433.6 -735.4 -1,875.1 
Islands -115.3 607.0 1,112.3 -91.3 
Total LDCs -8,710.1 -6,822.8 -4,508.2 -33,808.6 
As a percentage of imports of goods and services 
Africa and Haiti -28.8 -6.5 -3.6 -28.2 
Asia 2.3 -0.8 -1.4 -3.4 
Islands -7.7 20.6 29.1 -2.6 
Total LDCs -15.9 -4.1 -2.4 -19.7 
 As a percentage of GDP  
Africa and Haiti -9.4 -2.5 -1.4 -9.6 
Asia 0.7 -0.3 -0.4 -1.0 
Islands -5.7 17.0 26.6 -2.1 
Total LDCs -5.0 -1.5 -0.8 -6.4 
Source: IMF (2009.b) and World Economic Outlook database  
Asia 7 countries; Islands 7 countries; Africa 31 countries.   
*For a list of the countries see Appendix 4    
 
by the crisis than food products, which are subject to Engel’s Law8 and are also used in 
the production of biofuels as mentioned earlier. Manufactures exporters seem to have 
fared, on balance, slightly better. Nevertheless, even in their case, overreliance on a 
single, or a couple of, light manufactured goods increases vulnerability to external shocks 
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Table 25:  
Projected current account deficits of individual LDCs as a percentage of GDP (2009) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Exporting    Deficits (per cent)          Surplus 
Groups --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  > 20   15-20  10-15   5-10   1-5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum Dem. Rep. of   -------  Chad, Sudan  Angola,  Yemen   East Timor 
  Congo (26.1)       Equ. Guinea     Myanmar 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Other  Niger (22.1)            -------  Mozambique,   Mauritania, Mali, Guinea   ------- 
minerals      Zambia, Burundi Cen. Af. Rep. 
          Sierra Leone 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Agricultural Liberia (43.2)  -------  Burkina Faso  Solomon Is., Benin Afghanistan  ------- 
          Uganda, Malawi 
          G. Bissau, Kiribati 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufactures -------   -------  Lesotho  Cambodia  Haiti   Bangladesh, 
                Nepal, Bhutan 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Services Sao Tome (44.3) Gambia, -------   Samoa, Comoros -------   Eritrea (1.03) 
     Maldives,    Tanzania, Rwanda 
     Djibouti    Ethiopia, Vanuatu  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diversified -------   Madagascar, Senegal, Laos  Togo   -------    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
No. of countries 4  4  8   21   3   6  
--------------------- 
Source: Based on IMF (2009.b) 
Mis en forme : Espagnol (Costa Rica)
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Table 26 
Percentage Share of various product groups in  
manufacturing  production of  Nepal ( 1995-2005)  
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Product group   1995  2005 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Food and Beverages  35  45 
Textiles and clothing  34  19 
Machinery and equipment   2    7 
Chemicals     6  10 
Other manufactures  23  23 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
 
as indicated by the cases of Lesotho and Cambodia as compared with Nepal. Nepal has 
not only more diverse foreign exchange earnings, as workers’ remittances are equivalent 
to its total merchandise export earnings (Table 23); but its structure of exports and MVA 
is also diverse despite its smaller size of population than Cambodia (Table 269). Nepal is 
an interesting case which benefited from industrial collaboration with India for export 
diversification (Shafaeddin, 2008).  
 The countries which are worse hit in their current account are also mostly among 
highly indebted ones. Thus their debt sustainability will be undermined as well. 
According to an IMF simulation, assuming that low-income countries were able to 
replace the reduction in aid and FDI from external borrowings, their debt burden (total 
stock of debt/GDP) would increase further by about 4 per cent over a year (IMF,2009.a: 
p.25).  Such an assumption is, however, unrealistic because the economic crisis reduces 
their creditworthiness in the international market making it difficult to borrow from 
private banking, and borrowing from international financial institutions is limited. It is 
most likely that the constraints in financing the current account deficits will lead to a 
reduction in GDP, government expenditure, and private consumption with a negative 
impact on the manufacturing sector. 
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vi. Balance of payments constraints and problems of external financing 
Official flows account for the bulk of capital flows to poor countries as mentioned in 
section II. Their importance in financing the current account deficits of these countries 
increases further during the crisis because they should also compensate for the decline in 
private flows. Private flows, mainly FDI, accounted, on average, for over 10 per cent of 
long-term capital flows to LDCs during 2005-06. According to the IMF projection, net 
FDI and portfolio investment will decrease by about 10 per cent in 2009 as compared 
with 2008. As private flows to LDCs are very likely to decline, their current account 
deficits have to be financed by borrowing from international and regional financial 
institutions and grants. IMF assumes that LDCs’ net borrowing will decline in 2009 as 
compared with 2008 (Table 27), thus increasing the need for official inflows in the form 
of grants. While some pledges are made by G20, IMF, the World Bank and regional 
development banks, as of April 2009, the IMF projection indicates a substantial decline in 
GDP of LDCs as a result of the crisis and insufficient financial flows to LDCs. 
 
vii. Impact through GDP 
Judged by the projected rate of growth of GDP for 2009, as compared with the actual rate 
in 2007, Table (28) also indicates that the African and Island LDCs will be, on average, 
the most affected by the global economic crisis. According to the IMF projection, a few 
oil and mineral exporting countries, as well as Lesotho and Cambodia, the Maldives and 
the Comoros Islands will be among the countries with the lowest projected GDP growth 
rates in 2009. 
 The decline in exports of petroleum and mineral exporters has a negative impact 
on GDP directly, as well as indirectly through government revenue, as mentioned earlier. 
Commodity revenues as a percentage of GDP are projected to decline significantly in 
2009, as compared with 2008, ranging from 20 percentage points in the case of Chad to 3 
percentage points in the case of Mauritania (IMF,2009.a: p.22). 
 The main victims of the crisis which have important impacts on capacity 
utilization and capacity expansion are private consumption and private and public 
investment.  This has important implications for the utilization and expansion of capacity. 
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    Table 27:  
    Financial Net borrowing and FDI to LDCs, 2000-09 
   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Groups 2000 2007 
2008 
Change in 
2008 millions 
US$ 
2009 
Projections 
Net Borrowing ($m.) 
Africa and Haiti (29 countries) -23.55 -8,460.71 2,800.80 11,261.50 2,175.71 
Asia (6 countries) -65.64 79.18 -358.51 -437.69 26.06 
Islands (8 countries) 91.63 -2,212.35 
-
3,001.61 -789.26 -3,338.96 
Total LDCs (43 countries) 2.44 -10,593.88 -559.33 10,034.55 -1,137.20 
 Net FDI and portfolio investment  
Africa and Haiti (29 countries) 2,405 12,954 12374 -580.67 11,848 
Asia (7 countries) 526 3864 3182 -681.43 2922 
Islands (6 countries) 59 211 216 5.49 186 
Total LDCs (42 countries) 2,990 17,029 15,772 -1,256.60 14,956 
 Sum of the above  
Africa and Haiti (29 countries) 2,382 4,494 15,174 10,680.83 14.024 
Asia (7 countries) 460 3,943 2,824 -1,119.12 2,948 
Islands (6 countries) 151 -2,002 -2,785 -783.76 -3,153 
Total LDCs (42 countries) 2,993 6,435 15,213 8,777.95 13,819 
 
Source: Based on IMF (2009.b) 
Note: for a list of the countries included see Appendix 4    
 
Private consumption is severely affected by job losses and the reduction in income of 
households. Investment would be regarded as a residual by both the public and private 
sectors. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data on projections of investment 
and private consumption for LDCs. Nevertheless, some inferences can be made with the 
help of World Bank projections for low-income countries, as shown in Table 29.  The  
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Table 28 
GDP growth rates of LDCs, 2007-09 (per cent) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Groups 2007  2008  2009 
           (projected) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Africa  8.6  5.8  2.96 
Asia  6.2  5.24  4.99 
Island   5.0  5.89  2.97  
Total  7.6  5.72  3.3 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on Tables 20 and A.3 
 
data include some countries other than LDCs. Nevertheless, it provides some useful 
information.  Accordingly, as expected, the negative impact of the crisis on both private 
consumption and investment, particularly the latter, is more severe in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Assuming that the impact on growth of investment and private 
consumption is proportional to the growth in GDP, the impact on these variables seems to 
be milder in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa when South Africa is excluded. In the case of 
South Asia, the exclusion of India does not make any difference to changes in GDP 
growth, or therefore of private investment and private consumption. But with the 
exclusion of Pakistan the impact on the remaining countries would be milder. As 
expected, Bangladesh seems to be in a better situation than the others countries as a 
whole.  
 A number of public and private projects has been cancelled or postponed in 
African LDCs. For example, in Ethiopia a hydropower project of EUR 1.5 billion was 
cancelled. Burkina Faso has problems financing three mine projects, so do Tanzania and 
Guinea. In Senegal two infrastructure projects (a toll road and an airport) are delayed) 
(AfDB, 2009.a table 3). 
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 In short, investment in productive capacity seems to be the main victim of the 
global crisis on LDCs, particularly in Africa, but private consumption, and thus domestic 
demand for manufactures, is also severely affected. To what extent the manufacturing 
sector is affected by the negative impact of the global crisis through investment and 
domestic demand is not easily quantifiable. But there is already some evidence that the 
sector is severely under stress because of the combination of domestic demand and 
particularly exports. For example, in the case of Cambodia, in the first two months of 
2009, garment exports dropped by nearly 20 per cent compared with the same period of 
the previous year. It is estimated that between 40,000 to 60,000, out of over 300,000, 
garment workers have become unemployed in Cambodia (Salze-Lozac’h, 2009). In  
 
Table 29: 
Average annual rates of growth of GDP, fixed investment and private consumption 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (2006-09), percentages 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Change, 2006/07 
2006-07a 2008b  2009c   to 2009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
GDP at market pricesd   6.1    5.4    4.6    -1.6 
Private consumption    6.5    3.4    3.5    -3 
Investment   19.9  12.7    7.7  -12.2 
GDP excluding South Africa   6.6    6.6    5.7    -0.9 
GDP of oil exporters    7.6    7.8    6.6    -0.9 
 
South Asia: 
GDP at market prices    8.7    6.3    5.4    -3.3 
Private consumption    6.8    5.7    4.7    -2.1 
Investment   15    7.1    4.8  -10.2 
GDP excluding India    6.3    6.1    4    -2.3 
 Pakistan    6.1    6    3    -3.1 
 Bangladesh    6.5    6.2    5.7    -0.8 
--------------    
a. Average b. Estimate c. Forecast d. In US dollars of 2000.  
 
Source: World Bank (2009), Tables A9 and A11. 
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Madagascar and Lesotho several textile factories were closed. Madagascar “shows an 8 
per cent to 15 per cent decline in economic activity in various sectors” (Ibid., p. 16).In 
Uganda 15 factories closed in 2008 due to falling demand and increasing costs of 
production caused by devaluation (Ibid) and 15 more were expected to close in the first 
quarter of 2009 (AfDB (2009.b), Table 3) The garment industry of Nepal has also 
suffered from the closure of some factories and unemployment of its workers,10 although 
the data on the number of people who have lost their jobs is not available. 
 
V. Short- and long-term policies and strategies 
 
In this section we will refer to the possibilities for and constraints on short-term policies 
LDCs may wish to pursue in reaction to the global economic crisis. Subsequently, we 
will outline longer-term strategies for utilization of resources in case of the emergence of 
another commodity boom. The required trade and industrial policies, regional 
cooperation for industrial collaboration and a brief discussion of the role of EPZs are 
among other topics to be covered. 
  
1. Short-term policies and their constraints  
There is a limit to which LDCs can undertake counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies 
without extensive external financial support. Usually, the international financial 
institutions recommend a combination of expenditure cutting and expenditure switching 
(devaluation) when a developing country faces a severe balance of payments problem. 
Such policies are not effective to stimulate growth.  
 The origin of the current economic shock is external to the economy of LDCs; it 
is reflected mainly in commodity prices and the volume of exports of manufactured 
goods. Any contractionary monetary and fiscal policy would be pro-cyclical and will 
worsen the recession as it will contribute to further reduction in domestic demand (see 
Box 1 on Malawi). 
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i. Devaluation 
Often during a recession, in response to external shocks, devaluation of the exchange rate 
is imposed on LDCs by international financial institutions as a part of conditionality in 
their lending, even though the fall in exports is not necessarily due to the loss of 
competitiveness.  Devaluation in such a situation cannot lead to export expansion because 
the prices of both primary commodities as well as low-skilled manufactured goods are 
determined in the international market, on which small countries have no influence.11 
 The drop in exports is due to the income effect of the change in global economic 
activities. The price of primary commodities is demand determined in the international 
market; and thus devaluation, particularly by a small exporter of a primary commodity, 
has no impact on its international prices and demand. Further, through its direct and 
indirect (inflationary) effects, devaluation increases the costs of production in the 
manufacturing sector which has become increasingly dependent on imported inputs 
following trade liberalization of recent decades. The increase in the cost of production 
aggravates the fall in external and internal demand for manufactured goods leading to 
lower capacity utilization, loss in productivity and even closure of the producing firms.  
Box 1 
Malawi’s exposure to external shock: 
imposition of pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies by the IMF12 
Malawi is a landlocked and highly indebted country with heavy dependence on the 
production and exports of primary commodities (see Table A.1) and aid flows to cover its 
imports and debt servicing; the country receives little FDI. About half of the foreign aid 
received in 2007 had to be allocated to service its debts. Food and fuel accounted for over 
26 per cent of its imports and 48 per cent of its exports in 2006 (UNCTAD (2008.a), 
Table 3.1.)  Mainly because of high oil prices, the country suffered a loss from the terms 
of trade and inflation.  When the commodity shock of 2008-09 took place, the country 
had foreign reserve coverage of 1.1 month. The country approached the IMF in 
November 2008 within the framework of the Exogenous Shock Facility. Providing some 
financial help, the IMF imposed conditionalities in the form of fiscal and monetary 
restrictions in order to control inflation - even though the inflation was basically imported 
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and despite the fact that the Fund has, in principle, accepted the use of counter-cyclical 
policies.  The pro-cyclical economic policies no doubt will harm the growth of the country 
as the world economic recession bites. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that devaluation in the nominal exchange rate leads to 
devaluation of the real exchange rate, it will turn the internal terms of trade against 
manufactures and in favour of primary commodities. Thus it will have a long-term 
detrimental influence on growth of the manufacturing sector because it shifts the 
incentive for investment against the sector. Devaluation also increases the local cost of 
debt servicing, putting pressure on the government budget and reducing the prospect for 
financing investment. Thus while devaluation will not lead to export expansion, 
particularly by small exporters, it will have detrimental effects on the production of 
manufactured goods because of the consequential increase in the cost of imported inputs. 
 Yet devaluation has been a policy measure taken by many LDCs in reaction to the 
external shock. The crisis led to a drastic fall in foreign exchange reserves of a number of 
LDCs, particularly commodity dependent countries, which most of them are; and also 
among highly indebted countries. The inflationary pressure caused by shortages of 
foreign exchange was aggravated by devaluation. In the case of African LDCs, in 
particular, devaluation has been significant. For example, nearly a 66 per cent decline in 
copper prices between July and December 2008 was the main cause of devaluation of 
33.5 per cent in the Zambian currency between end-July 2008 and mid-February 2009 
(AfDB,2009.a: table 3). Copper accounted, on average, for nearly 65 per cent by value of 
Zambian merchandise exports during 2005-06(UNCTAD, 2008.a: table 3.2.D).  Zambia 
figured among highly indebted countries with a debt stock/GDP ratio of over 23 per cent 
in 2006 (Table A.1) 13 . In the Democratic Republic of Congo, which depends on 
petroleum and other minerals for over 90 per cent of its exports, devaluation of about 40 
per cent took place over the same period. While these two countries are extreme cases in 
Africa, they are not the only ones. Over the same period Lesotho devalued its currency by 
25.6 per cent, Madagascar by 20.1 per cent, the Comoros, Benin, Cape Verde, the 
Gambia and Uganda between 15 and 20 per cent; Ethiopia, Mauritania and Tanzania, 10-
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15 per cent, and Mozambique and the Sudan by 5-10 per cent.14 With the exception of 
Lesotho all the devaluing countries were highly indebted ones (AfDB, 2009.a: table 3). 
 Devaluation increases production costs in the manufacturing sector directly more 
than the other sectors because of its greater dependence on imported inputs. Furthermore, 
where the imported food bill is high, devaluation adds to the inflationary pressure as it 
may initiate a price-wage spiral because food is a wage good. In fact, in 2008, for which 
data are readily available for most LDCs, the rate of inflation has exceeded 10 per cent in 
the majority of Asian LDCs (mostly smaller countries) and in more than half of African 
ones. Furthermore inflation accelerated in most cases. As there is a lag between 
devaluation and its inflationary impact, inflation must have accelerated in 2009. 
 
ii. Macroeconomic stimulus 
In LDCs a fiscal and monetary stimulus will have little effect on the economy, including 
the manufacturing sector, unless sufficient external finance for the current account deficit 
is provided to the country. There is an important difference between a developed country 
and an LDC as far as the effectiveness of a macroeconomic stimulus is concerned. In the 
case of a developed country (e.g. the USA) which is in the possession of an international 
currency, the country has in a sense no foreign exchange constraint; it pays for its imports 
with its national currency. Furthermore, the fall in exports can be, to a large extent, 
compensated by stimulating domestic demand as the economy is relatively flexible. In the 
case of LDCs, the supply of foreign exchange is the main constraint. Most LDCs already 
had significant deficits in the current account of their balance of payments. Any fiscal and 
monetary stimulus would put further pressure on their current account at least 
proportional to the imports/GDP ratio for every unit increase in domestic demand. 
Furthermore, the loss in external demand for primary commodities cannot be 
compensated for by increases in effective demand for other domestically produced goods. 
When exports of manufactured goods are concentrated in one or two products, e.g. 
clothing, no amount of stimulus can switch demand from exports to the domestic market 
sufficiently. 
 Thus any macroeconomic stimulus has to be complemented by extra sources of 
external finance and debt forgiveness by the international community. According to the 
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IMF the extra external financial resources needed for low-income countries, the majority 
of which are LDCs, is between US$25 billion and US$138 billions (IMF,2009.a:35). 
 
iii. Import restrictions under the “balance of payments” clause 
There are two tools available to LDCs which can be, in fact should be, utilized, even if 
extra financial resources are provided to them. These are the use of “balance of payments 
clauses” of the WTO rules for targeted import restrictions and control of capital outflows 
(Akyüz, 2009). Management of foreign exchange reserves also could be a possibility in a 
limited number of cases.  
 WTO rules allow temporary import restrictions when there is a severe balance of 
payment deficits. To have a positive impact on domestic output and productive capacity, 
the import restriction should be targeted at items which do not contribute to the supply of 
domestically produced goods , directly or indirectly (e.g. imported inputs necessary for 
production of manufactures) and the supply of basic needs.  
 
vi. Capital account control 
The neo-liberals and neo-liberal institutions often put pressure on developing countries, 
including LDCs, to liberalize the capital account of the balance of payments. While such 
a policy may contribute, in theory, to the attraction of FDI and portfolio investment when 
the world economy is doing well, it can result in the accelerated exodus of capital, by 
nationals or foreign firms, when a country faces recession and current account problems 
as was the case during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Capital flows should be 
controlled and managed. The successful experience of Malaysia during the Asian 
financial crisis, as well as Chile, reveals the importance of controlling capital flight15 
during an economic crisis. In the case of LDCs, in fact, it should be a long-term policy of 
the government due to the severe scarcity of foreign exchange. Otherwise, erratic 
movements of capital flows will result in erratic movements in the flow of imports, 
exchange rate, interest rate, production costs and the price structure, exacerbating 
instability in output and the uncertainty and risks of investment. There is evidence that 
instability in the flow of imports, in particular, affects the growth of MVA and GDP 
(Helleiner, 1986). Furthermore, the available data on 42 low-income countries indicates 
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that during 1970-2004, their accumulated capital flight was nearly three times higher than 
their accumulated debt stock! (UNCTAD, 2009.a: table 10).  
 
v. Management of reserves 
 A few LDCs have a better chance of managing their foreign exchange reserves to 
reduce instability in imports or to remedy the impact of external shocks. They include oil 
exporting countries and some Island countries which have shown surpluses in their 
current accounts during the recent boom and are likely to develop surpluses in the event 
of another boom. These countries have some room to manoeuvre by cushioning the 
allocation of their foreign exchange. Angola has done so to some extent by accumulating 
reserves during the boom. East Asian countries managed to increase their reserve 
holdings after their experience of the Asian financial crisis (Park and Estrada, 2009).  
 All in all, short-term counter-cyclical measures available to LDCs are limited; 
they need to diversify their economies, which requires long-term development and 
industrial strategies.  
 
2. Long-term strategies and policies  
i. Diversity of LDCs  
The diversity of LDCs, despite the fact that they show some common features, would 
imply that one cannot recommend a unique set of policies which would “fit all”. In 
particular, the difference in the size of their populations, ranging from 10,000 in the case 
of Tuvalu to nearly 160 million in the case of Bangladesh, in their geographical locations 
and access to the sea and their capacity in production and exports of manufactured goods, 
or their dependence on primary commodities - all are of significant concern. For example, 
for primary commodity exporting countries, the main issue is diversification of their 
production and export structure out of the primary sector. By diversification, here we do 
not mean restricting production of primary commodities to reduce their importance in 
production and exports in absolute terms.  We use diversification in a wider sense of the 
term. What is required is to use the commodity sector itself as a means of expanding 
activities outside the primary sector; thus eventually the share of the primary sector in 
GDP and exports will be reduced. In this sense the use of windfall gains for investment in 
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diversification activities is, inter alia, important,. For this purpose, there is a need for a 
development and industrial strategy for which the government has an important role to 
play. 
 For “manufacture exporters” the key issue is upgrading of the structure of 
production and exports of manufactures as they often depend heavily on a single product, 
e.g, clothing. Manufactured goods are cost-determined in industrialized countries. 
Nevertheless, in the case of developing countries where a large number of small countries 
export the same labour intensive product, such as clothing, the price determination of the 
products is similar to primary commodities. Its international price is demand-determined 
and thus subject to severe changes during the global economic crisis.  
 For small countries their size is a major constraint on the development of a 
competitive manufacturing sector for producing goods for the domestic market and/or 
exports, particularly for remote island countries in the Asia-Pacific area. For landlocked 
countries transport infrastructure is an additional concern which limits their prospects for 
integration into the world economy. While large countries, particularly those with access 
to the sea, have, cet. par., more room to manoeuvre in undertaking trade and industrial 
policies, landlocked countries and, in particular, small countries which are in proximity 
with other countries need regional cooperation with their neighbouring countries for the 
division of labour and specialization in production and international trade. 
 Nevertheless, a few issues require general discussion in the consideration of  
development strategies of LDCs. These issues include the role of the government, the 
market and enterprises, trade and industrial policies and foreign direct investment. The 
role of regional integration and industrial collaboration, and export processing zones will 
also be discussed.  Bearing in mind the importance of the commodity sector, let us first 
mention a few words about the prospects for commodity prices and management of 
commodity booms before proceeding further.  
 
ii. Prospects for commodity prices  
The prospects for commodity prices have important implications for development and 
industrial policies of most LDCs. Generally speaking, a commodity price boom eases the 
balance of payments and fiscal constraints of the exporting countries; but in the case of 
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net food importers it has a negative influence on their balance of payments and 
investment. By contrast, a decline in prices eases the pressure on the import bill of food 
importers; but adds to their fiscal and balance of payments constraints as a result of the 
drop in prices of other commodities. Furthermore, the very nature of price instability 
creates uncertainty and risk of investment not only in the primary sector, but also in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Different international organizations have come up with different forecasts for 
various commodity prices in the medium to long run. Nevertheless, they more or less 
show fairly similar results as far as the future prices of the main food items (wheat, maize, 
rice, sugar and vegetable oil) are concerned. For example, a forecast by OECD-FAO 
(2008) indicates that their prices will recover in late 2009 and will remain above their 
2006 levels,16 in the current and following decades, particularly in the case of vegetable 
oils.  One reason given for the high price prediction for these products is their use for the 
production of biofuels.  
 The World Bank (2009), extrapolating from past decades (beginning in 1970) 
into the future, making some assumptions about the fall in GDP intensity of primary 
commodities and taking into account the working of Engel’s law, concludes that in the 
long run, the prices of primary commodities will not be particularly high. This is because, 
it is argued, the growth in demand for commodities will ease(Ibid.59), “supplies of 
extracted commodities are likely to remain ample”(Ibid.6) and new reserves of petroleum 
would be found (Ibid.7).  However, it does not rule out price increases in the medium 
terms (Ibid.6) for minerals and food products. A forecast by the IMF (IMF,2009,b: 44-51) 
indicates that the prospect for high prices is uncertain.  Its medium forecast would show 
that with unchanged prices, demand for aluminium, copper and petroleum will recover 
significantly during 2009-13, reaching the 2006-07 average in the high growth scenario 
of the world economy and slightly below that average in a low growth scenario. Thus in 
the low growth scenario, it concludes, “capacity constraints are unlikely to put upward 
pressure on prices before 2012-13(Ibid.50). 
 There are so many assumptions in such forecasts, including assumptions on the 
timing and extent of the recovery in the global economy, that one cannot predict the exact 
price of primary commodities with certainty. Nevertheless, a couple of points are worth 
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emphasizing. First, certainly the future is uncertain. Secondly, it is very likely that 
commodity prices will be more unstable in the future than in the past. This is because the 
instability in the business cycle in the world economy has increased during the last 
decade and is very likely to be intensified further (Akyuz, 2008) unless, the markets, and 
particularly financial markets, are regulated. One reason for such a likely intensification 
is the growing importance of financial sector in economic activities in advanced countries 
and increases in speculative activities in this sector. 
 Thirdly, in view of the growing weight of China and other East Asian developing 
countries and India in the world economy and their relatively high predicted rate of 
growth of GDP, it is very likely that there will be again a boom in commodity prices 
sooner or later. For example, according to a forecast by JP Morgan, in 2010 China will 
resume its 2008 rate of growth of GDP of 9 per cent and India will exceed its 2008 rate of 
growth of 6.1 per cent by 1.1 percentage points (GP Morgan online, August 7 2009). 
Finally, the very increase in the instability in the world economy is likely to have 
a negative impact on investment in primary commodities, and therefore on their supply 
and price stability. 
   
Table 30: 
The rate of inflation in LDCs in 2008 
 
Range of 
inflation 
rates 
Africa and Haiti Asia 
No. of 
countries Countries 
No. of 
countries Countries 
4-5 3 Comoros*, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia,  1 Vanuatu 
5-10 13 
Madagascar, Benin*, Uganda*, Cape 
Verde*, Cent.Af.Rep.*, Eritrea*, Mali*, 
Mauritania*, Sierra Leone*, Malawi*, 
Senegal, Togo*, Chad* 
4 
Laos*, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan*, Samoa*, East 
Timor*, Nepal* 
10-15 12 
Angola*, Sudan*, Burkina Faso*, 
Rwanda*, Haiti*, Tanzania*, Lesotho*, 
Niger*, Mozambique*, Djibouti*, Guinea- 
Bissao*, Zambia 
3 
Kiribati*, Maldives*, 
Papua New Guinea* 
15-20 2 Dem. Rep.of Congo*, Liberia,  4 Solomon Islands*, Cambodia*, Yemen* 
20-25 2 Burundi*, Guinea   
25-3 2 Ethiopia*, Sao Thome*, 2 Afghanistan*, Myanmar* 
Total 34  14  
 
Source: IMF,(2009), Table A.7  
Note: * means that inflation accelerated in 2008. 
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Therefore, considering that there is a limit to the availability of short-term policy tools to 
LDCs to counter external shocks and instability, the formulation and implementation of 
long-term strategies will take more importance in the future. 
 
iii. Markets and Government 
The financial crisis and the resulting global economic crisis is a wake-up call for LDCs as 
well as other developing countries to reconsider the “market oriented” approach to 
industrial and development strategies. Such strategies have been advocated by the 
international financial institutions and the so-called “Washington Consensus”; they have 
already been imposed on developing countries not only through international financial 
institutions, but also through the WTO and bilateral donors. The LDCs are also under the 
pressure from the EU to liberalize their foreign trade and internal markets further through 
EPAs. Yet, the recent global financial crisis has revealed that market forces have 
deficiencies also in industrialized countries, let alone developing countries, particularly 
LDCs.  
 The market is only one element in the coordination of economic activities. The 
“coordination system” consists of the market, firms and government, complemented and 
supported by “non-price factors” (institutions, infrastructure, information and back-up 
services (Shafaeddin 2005.b; chapter 4). Without the development of non-price factors 
the market cannot operate efficiently. The price mechanism is slow to create markets and 
develop non-price factors. The market mechanism can deal with gradual and marginal 
changes. But it is inadequate to accelerate growth of supply capacity and promote 
dynamic comparative advantage; to make inefficient industries efficient and competitive, 
when it uses particularly through shock therapy; to promote technological learning and 
achieve technological upgrading automatically. Hence, some government intervention is 
required to complement market forces at all levels of development. But the government 
actions and policies should complement the market, not replace it. Meanwhile, in contrast 
to the neo-liberals’ presumption, firms are not passive: the firm, in our view, is the central 
driving force in the coordinating system since productive capacity is built up at the firm 
level. 
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 The relative roles of each element of the coordination system, i.e. the market, 
enterprises and government, and their interactions, vary from one country to another and 
in each specific country over time in the process of development. LDCs face a dilemma 
as they are at early stages of development and industrialization; there is a great risk of 
market failure, entrepreneurship failure as well as government failure. There is a vicious 
circle: the coordination mechanism fails because of the low level of development; there is 
a low level of development because of the weak coordination system. In breaking this 
vicious circle, however, the government must play a key role to create or improve the 
market, to increase the organizational capacity of the entrepreneurs, to develop 
complementary non-price factors and last, but not least, to enhance the capacity of the 
state machinery. In fact, the key to industrialization at early stages of development is to 
improve the learning capacity and efficiency of the government machinery in formulating, 
implementing, monitoring and correcting policies (Shafaeddin, op.cit). At early stages of 
industrialization, the government may have to invest directly in areas where the private 
sector, including TNCs, is not prepared to take risks. As markets and enterprises develop, 
the role of the government in industrialization should decrease. In short, the question is 
not market or government. It is to what extent and in what form the government should 
intervene to minimize government failure and market failure and inadequacies. But it is 
also important to avoid unnecessary, rigid and prolonged intervention as markets and 
enterprises are developed. Both functional and selective government intervention are 
required for capacity building as well as upgrading of the industrial structure. 
 
iv. Trade and industrial policies for large countries and countries involved in industrial 
collaboration 
While both large and small countries, irrespective of their production capabilities, need 
dynamic trade and industrial policies there is a crucial difference between the two, 
irrespective of their production capabilities. Highly populated countries have the added 
advantage of large potential domestic markets - although their industrial collaboration 
with others should not be ruled out. Small countries, particularly those which are in 
proximity with other countries, need to enter in collaboration with other countries, large 
or small, through production sharing if they opt for developing a competitive 
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manufacturing sector. Thus one can outline trade and industrial policies which can be 
applied to individual populated countries as well as a community of countries which enter 
industrial collaboration.  
 
a. A framework for trade and industrial strategy 
Assuming a country, or group of LDCs, has the wish to develop their industrial sector, we 
will first refer to a framework for an effective long-run industrial strategy. Subsequently, 
the constraints in its implementation will be outlined.  
 As mentioned in section III, premature and across-the-board trade liberalization 
will lead to de-industrialization or at best production and exports of low-skill intensive 
products and assembly operations (see also Shafaeddin, 2006.a). The process of 
industrialization entails creating capacity, operating it efficiently and upgrading the 
industrial structure. Such a process requires the country to develop its industries in 
accordance with the principal of “dynamic comparative advantage”. We have shown 
elsewhere that the experience of all successful early and late industrializers indicates that 
industrial policy should be selective, mixed, dynamic, predictable and performance linked 
(Shafaeddin, 2005.a and 2006.b). There are a few main reasons for the need for 
selectivity in of the incentive structure in developing countries, particularly LDCs which 
are at early stages of development: stronger supply response to prices when prices 
changes for a few goods than when outputs of a sector are equally affected; scarcity of 
resources; the presence of different pecuniary and technological externalities, learning 
effects and linkages, in different industries; dynamic economies of time and scale, in 
industries where scale is important; and strategic trade i.e. when trade in a product is 
manipulated, managed or targeted for support by foreign competitors (see Shafaeddin, 
2009: 4-15 for details). 
 Policy dynamism implies that trade and industrial policies should be adaptable 
and flexible during the process of industrialization. Initially, some consumer goods, 
particularly those which involve externalities, are to be chosen for capacity building with 
some support from the government, leaving their imported inputs free of duty. As these 
industries are developed, measures should be taken to make them efficient. While the 
production of these goods should be gradually liberalized, support is required for their 
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entry into the international market. As these industries go through the second phase, the 
industrial policy should aim at the expansion of supply capacity for some other consumer 
goods and /or for intermediate products needed for the first group of industries. When 
these industries mature and enter the international market, they should be liberalized 
gradually. Subsequently, some inputs to the second group, such a some sophisticated and 
durable consumer goods and machinery used in the production of the first group can be 
chosen for support. Such a rolling system of mixed process of protection and 
liberalization should continue until a competitive industrial structure is built up, export 
capabilities are developed and capacities for the efficient production of some machinery 
are acquired.  
 In such a dynamic process the trade policy would consist of a mixture of 
protection and liberalization at each phase of industrialization. A  necessary hypothetical 
tariff structure for such an industrial strategy is shown in table 31, in which industries are 
grouped according to their factor intensity. Accordingly, at each phase of industrialization  
 
Table 31 
Hypothetical evolution of average percentage tariffs for various groups of industries 
at different phases of industrialization 
  
Phase 
Factor intensity of industry 
Manufactures 
(average) 
Resource-
based, 
labour-
intensive 
Low 
technology 
Medium 
technology 
High 
technology 
I 20 0 0 0 5 
II 10 40 0 0 12.5 
III 0 30 50 0 20 
IV 0 20 40 40 25 
V 0 10 30 40 20 
VI 0 0 15 25 10 
VII 0 0 5 15 5 
VIII 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: Akyüz (2005), p. 27. 
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some industries enjoy relatively high tariff rates. Nevertheless, the average tariff rate at 
each phase is always lower than the industry specific (individual) tariff rates. The average 
tariff rate initially increases gradually as more technology intensive products are chosen 
for development, but it begins to fall subsequently until it approaches zero eventually.  
 
 It is important that the incentives provided by the government should be linked to 
the performance of the firms in cost reduction and quality improvement. Furthermore, the 
industrial strategy should involve both rewards and pressure. For example, competitive 
pressure should first be introduced in the domestic market and subsequently through 
gradual trade liberalization as mentioned above. In industries in which economies of scale 
are important, however, the competitive pressure should not be at the cost of production 
on an efficient scale until a minimum efficient scale of production is reached.  
 
b. Constraints and possibilities for implementing trade and industrial policies  
While the need for selectivity in promotion of industries in developing countries has 
increased for the reasons mentioned in section III, the necessary policy instruments for 
industrial support in general, and for targeting in particular, have become less and less 
available. Nevertheless, there still some room for manoeuvring, particularly in the case of 
LDCs. 
As far as trade policy is concerned, the liberalization of trade under the Uruguay 
Round reduces the possibility of infant industry protection and targeting. The articles of 
the Uruguay Round’s Agreements prohibits various kinds of subsidies, including income 
and price supports, for export and production which are “specific to an enterprise or 
industry” (Shafaeddin,2005.a, chapter 8). Nevertheless, LDCs still have some room to 
manoeuvre, in applying selective support for infant industries (Rodrik, 2004). For 
example, the bound tariffs for individual products are higher than applied tariffs, and 
subsidization of exports by countries with per capita incomes of less than US$1,000 are 
allowed by WTO rules. Most LDCs are in this category.  
 Yet there is continuous pressure on LDCs through bilateral trade agreements and 
conditionalities of International Financial Institutions for the reduction of tariff levels and 
their dispersion. Many LDCs may have to resort to the World Bank and IMF for financial 
help during the global economic crisis. Added to these pressures is the pressure through 
negotiation on the Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations at the WTO, and 
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particularly those for the EPAs. If agreed upon, EPAs, in particular, will lead to further 
de-industrialization of those developing countries which are at the early stages of 
industrialization and development; and they will create constraints for upgrading of the 
industrial structure of those that have some industrial and export capacity (Shafaeddin, 
2009). 
Therefore, LDCs should refrain from signing the EPAs as they are proposed by 
the EU, and resist further pressure through bilateral agreements and IFIs. Nevertheless, 
this is more easily said than done as LDCs are in a weak bargaining position. There is an 
urgent need for the revision of the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO 
and bilateral donors. 
 
v. Other factors  
 Installation of new capacity is necessary, but not sufficient. The installed capacity 
should be utilized efficiently. In technical terms a firm should be producing on a 
production possibility curve, and not inside it, which implies full utilization of installed 
capacity. If it does so, the firm will be “X-efficient”. While competitive pressures and 
performance requirements, as mentioned earlier, contribute to X-efficiency, there are also 
other contributory factors inside and outside the firm. To explain further, achieving X-
efficiency, i.e. efficient utilization of existing installed capacity, is important because it 
creates external economies for other firms while it also benefits from external economies 
created by the government as well as other firms. This is because organizational factors 
within the firm as well as institutional and infrastructural factors outside the firm 
contribute to achieving X-efficiency. When efficiency is achieved, it will spill over to 
other firms which may use the outputs of a firm as their inputs. 
 The upgrading of the production structure requires the development of  
technological and organizational capabilities and other skills at the firm level. The 
experience of China as well as other late industrializers, however, indicates that 
organizational, institutional and infrastructural factors and back-up services are also 
crucial (Gallaher and Shafaeddin, 2009).  
 Generally speaking, trade and industrial policies alone cannot succeed in the 
expansion of supply capacity, in the efficient use of the installed capacity and in 
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upgrading of the production structure. In addition to COU (Creation, efficient Operation 
and Upgrading) of the supply capacity there is a need for several INs (Investment, Input, 
Infrastructure, Institutions, Innovation and Information) (Streeten, 1987) and Ps (Political 
stability, Predictability of Policies, Pressure for Performance, Participatory Politics, 
Public-Private relations and respect for Property rights). There are also two INs to be 
avoided: Instability in exchange rates and Inflation, which are related not only to 
macroeconomic policies, but also to control of capital flows and the development of 
agriculture.17 
 
vi. The importance of agricultural development in industrialization 
In the traditional literature on economic development, agriculture is supposed to 
contribute to industrialization by providing  surplus for investing in industrial capacity 
building, and supplying agricultural raw materials as inputs to the production process.  
However, in our view in the process of development, particularly at earlier stages of 
industrialization, the agricultural sector also makes another significant contribution to 
industrialization by providing an ample supply of foods. Food products are wage goods. 
Their availability contributes to the growth of GDP and MVA by easing inflation. It does 
so by easing the pressure on the balance of payments and supply of capital goods and 
imported intermediate goods which are necessary for industrialization and production. 
More importantly, as food constitutes the major item in the consumption basket of wage 
earners, its availability at low prices contributes to low wages, and therefore the 
competitiveness of the country in international markets. The experience of all industrial 
countries as well as East Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) indicates that 
attention to agricultural development has been an ingredient in their development and 
industrialization policies.  
 As far as LDCs are concerned, likely prospects for high food prices make the 
development of food products an urgent need. In the majority of LDCs food accounts for 
a significant proportion of their imports. To repeat, according to UNCTAD, in 2006 the 
value of food imports was equivalent to  nearly a quarter of the foreign exchange earnings 
from merchandise exports of LDCs and 2.75 per cent of their GDP (and it reached about 
4.25 per cent of their GDP in 2008 (UNCTAD,2009.a:charts 17 and 18). Manufacture 
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exporting LDCs, in fact, spent about 30 per cent of their export earnings on import of 
foods in 2006; yet, nearly 30 per cent of their population are undernourished (Ibid. Box 
chart 4).  
 Of course, one may argue that if a country has a comparative advantage in the 
production and export of manufactured goods and can afford to import foods, there 
should not be a cause for concern. Nevertheless, in a country where foreign exchange is 
scarce, sufficient foreign exchange is not available, resources are unemployed and the 
country has the capacity to increase yields in food production, thus domestically produce 
food at low prices, development of the agricultural sector should be given special 
attention in its development and industrialization strategy. The increase in the supply of 
food could contribute to better nourishment of the work force. Improvement in the 
nutrition of the workforce and low prices of food in turn contribute to improvement in the 
workforce’s health and productivity and low wages - and thereby enhance  
competitiveness in the international market. Furthermore, the expansion of domestic 
supply of food items involves external economies. Every dollar saved as a result of 
domestic production of foods provides extra resources for importing capital goods 
necessary for capacity building in the industrial sector. In 2006, in many LDCs the value 
of imports of food items was equivalent to about a quarter of fixed capital formation.  
Agricultural development requires ample overhead investment in such areas as 
transport and irrigation infrastructure, seed improvement, storage, agricultural extension 
facilities and back-up services in the upstream and downstream activities of the value 
chain of agricultural production (ECA, 2009).  
 The competitive pressure from cheap imports had been an important obstacle to 
the development of food production in developing countries until very recently. The 
combination of their liberalization of agricultural trade and low international prices due to 
agricultural subsidies provided by developed countries led to low prices of imported 
foods before the recent food crisis. Each year these countries provide nearly US$400 
billion worth of subsidies to production and exports of their agricultural sector. This 
amount is equivalent to four times the total exports and about 90 times exports of  
agricultural exporting LDCs in 2006. LDCs should resist further liberalization of their 
agriculture either through EPAs or the WTO.  
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vii. Industrial collaboration through regional cooperation 
The experience of regional trade agreements among developing countries during the last 
half century indicates that low-income countries benefit little from such agreements when 
all, or most, of the members are among least developed countries. The main reason for 
the relatively small expansion of regional trade among low-income countries lies in 
similarities in the production and export structures of the countries concerned, as we have 
shown elsewhere (Shafaeddin, 2008). Even the manufactured exports of LDCs are 
concentrated in one, or a few, labour intensive products, such as textiles and clothing, as 
mentioned earlier. Such products are among the first group of items of production on 
which low-income countries usually embark. 
   
Table 32: 
Development of trade of within regional groups in Africa 
 
Regional 
groups 
Value (US$ millions) Share in exports (per cent) Average annual growth rate by value 
1980 2000 2006 1980 2000 2006 1980-2000 2000-06 
CEMAC 75 96 245 1.6 1 0.9 2.4 16.9 
COMESA 569 1,443 3,489 1.8 4.6 4.2 9.7 15.8 
CEPGL 2 10 24 0.1 0.8 1.3 17.4 15.7 
UMA 109 1,094 2,400 0.3 2.3 2.0 25.9 14 
ECOWAS 661 2,715 5,957 9.6 7.6 8.3 15.1 13.9 
UEMEOA 460 741 1,545 9.6 13.1 13.1 4.8 13 
SADC 106 4,383 8,571 0.4 9.4 9.1 45.1 11.8 
ECCAS 89 191 334 1.4 1.1 0.6 7.9 9.7 
MRU 7 5 8 0.8 0.4 0.3 -3 8.1 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2008.a), Table 1.4 
Abbreviations: CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; COMESA: Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; UMA: Arab Maghreb Union; ECOWAS: Economic Community 
of West African States; UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union; SADC: Southern African 
Development Community, ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; MRU: Mano River 
Union. 
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For example, despite the fact that East Asia has been a dynamic region during the last 
couple of decades, the low-income countries of this region and South-East Asia, most of 
which are members of one or more regional groups, have benefited little from regional 
trade agreements. Even Cambodia and Bangladesh, which are the most industrialized 
Asian LDCs (see Table A.1) showed a negative growth rate of exports to the region. Yet 
Bangladesh is a member of two regional groups and both Bangladesh and Cambodia are 
members of a number of bilateral regional trade agreements as well.  
 Regional trade in Africa faces the same type of problem as in Asia  As is shown in 
table 32, regional trade expanded to some extent during 1980-2000, following the 
establishment of trade agreements, particularly in the case of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Nevertheless, the share of regional trade in the total 
trade of the region fell during the latter period, 2000-06.  The noticeable expansion of 
regional trade in the case of SADC is mainly due to the involvement of South Africa, 
which has a more advanced industrial base than other member countries. When member 
countries of the regional groups trade with each other in accordance with their static 
comparative advantages, i.e. they export what they already produce. Free trade 
agreements, or preferential tariffs, may facilitate regional trade in products that are 
already produced in the member countries, provided the necessary back-up services and 
infrastructure are available. They are, however, per se, insufficient to encourage 
production and trade in new products or to facilitate upgrading of the structure of 
production and exports. This is also clearly indicated by the pattern of trade of countries 
involved in bilateral trade agreements in Africa. Raw materials, particularly petroleum, 
are dominant items of trade among countries involved in 24 bilateral trade agreements in 
Africa. Again the only noticeable exception is South Africa. Of course, in addition to 
similarities in their production and export structures, landlocked countries also suffer 
from the added problem of high cost of transportation.  
 How can regional integration contribute to industrialization? The answer is that 
instead of trade leading to a division of labour and specialization, specialization and the 
division of labour in production should lead to trade expansion. This can be arranged 
through industrial collaboration, in accordance with the principle of dynamic, rather than 
static, comparative advantage, along with the provision of back-up services. For this 
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purpose concerted policy measures and efforts by the countries concerned are required 
for cooperation for building supply capacity. Market forces alone will not lead to such a 
division of labour.  
 LDCs have unemployed human resources which can be potentially used for the 
expansion of production and trade in addition to what they already export to the North or 
other developing countries. Nevertheless, they suffer from the scarcity of skilled labour 
and other complementary factors of production necessary for such an expansion, as well 
as low effective demand:  
 Individual countries do not have sufficient resources to produce a large number of 
 products. They can enter into an agreement for industrial collaboration [and 
 production sharing] whereby each of the countries allocates scarce resources in a 
 way that enables each of them to specialize in the production of a limited number 
 of finished goods and/or P&C[parts and components) and exchange them with 
 each other. Initially, trade among the countries involved could take place 
 through the exchange of the new products produced even though they entail high 
 production costs. Yet the exporting countries could gain increased employment, 
 income and experience. Experience is gained more easily through specialization. 
 An additional advantage of such industrial collaboration is the benefits arising 
 from economies of scale. The combination of specialization, a larger market, 
 economies of scale and experience contribute to a reduction of production costs 
 over time. Therefore, they also can eventually export the products concerned to 
 the third markets (Shafaeddin, 2008:42). 
Industrial collaboration can contribute to the creation of effective demand and at the same 
time remedy the scarcity problem of complementary factors of production. Industrial 
collaboration can be arranged by neighbouring, particularly landlocked countries, around 
their border areas or between small and Island countries which are in proximity with 
other countries, including non-LDCs. 
 To emphasize for the development of the industrial capacity of individual 
countries, specialization and division of labour are crucial. Division of labour here means 
not only sharing the market, but also specializing in production of different products. 
Each country will specialize in production of one or a few parts and components of a 
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product for assembly operation. Production of parts and components as well as assembly 
operation for different products will be shared through production sharing among the 
countries involved. Of course, in arranging industrial collaboration the characteristics, 
economic structure and capabilities of specific countries need to be taken into account. It 
also requires the development of technological capabilities and other skills and the 
harmonization of trade and industrial policies among the countries involved. There is also 
a need for appropriate rules of origin. Furthermore, the product to be chosen for industrial 
collaboration should be identified; the processing of raw materials before exporting to 
other countries of the region could be one possibility, but it is not the only one. UNIDO 
can assist the countries concerned in the above issues, including studying the feasibility, 
modalities and choice of products for industrial collaboration, providing technical and 
technological training etc. 
 For the purpose of industrial collocation, the countries concerned may also use 
FDI and create EPZs. Nevertheless EPZs here should contribute to the industrial 
collaboration programmes. Furthermore, both FDI and EPZs should be conducive to the 
industrial strategy of the countries concerned.  
 
viii. The role of FDI  
FDI may provide certain skills and an important marketing channel for the exports of 
LDCs. Furthermore, it is maintained that when an economy opens up to trade and FDI, an 
initial period of imitation will lead to a large catch-up opportunity followed by a shift 
towards innovation “as the knowledge gap is reduced and the economy’s technical 
maturity rises”(Elkan,1996) However, least developed countries attract little FDI, 
particularly to their manufacturing sector, despite their liberalization of foreign 
investment regimes and the provision of incentives for their attraction. table 33 provides 
data on the inflow of FDI to LDCs in 2007 in absolute terms, when it was at its highest 
level. Accordingly, first of all FDI accounts for less than 15 per cent of their gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) (UNCTAD, 2008.c: table B.3). Secondly, while LDCs account 
for over 14 per cent of the population of developing countries, in 2007 they attracted only 
2.3 per cent of the inflow of FDI to developing countries as a whole, and their per capita 
FDI inflow is only about 15 per cent of that of other developing countries. Thirdly, FDI 
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in LDCs is concentrated in primary commodities. The manufacturing exporters show the 
smallest FDI per capita among various groups shown in the table. 18   By contrast, 
petroleum and other minerals received nearly half of the inflow of FDI to LDCs and 
figure the highest in terms of FDI inflow per capita.  
 In recent years, China has been active in investing in the mineral sector in Africa, 
including African LDCs, in order to secure the supply of primary commodities for its 
industrialization. For example, it has invested in petroleum in Angola and the Sudan, in 
copper in Zambia and in nickel and cobalt in the Congo. More recently, some intra-  
 
Table 33: 
Population and FDI inflow to various groups of LDCs in 2007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Main exporting  
Groups     Population                Value 
       --------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- 
           No. of  Millions  %   US$  % $per 
         countries     millions   capita 
Petroleum & gasa    6    142.6  18.1    3,486  29.9   24.4 
Other mineral     9      88.8  11.3    1,728  18.1   19.4 
Agriculture  10    107  13.6    1,613  14.3   15.1 
Manufactures    7    209  26.6    1,802  15.4    8.6 
Services  12    139.4  17.7    1,468  12   10.5 
Diversified    4      43.5    5.5    1,144    9.8   26.2 
Total above  48    731.3  92.8  11,678     15.9 
Sudan and Angola   2      54.3    7.1       n.a.     n.a. 
Total LDCs  50    758.6  100  11,678b     15.9 
Other developing countries 4,600.3c   488,069  106.9 
Total developing countries: 5,358.9c   499,747    93.2  
      excl. China and HK  4,046    259,520    64.1  
     excl. China,HK and India: 2,877    236,570    82.2 
 excl.LDCs  2,128.4    224,882  105.6 
Share of LDCs in developing countries  14.1      2.3 
------------------------------------------------ 
a: 2006; excludes the Sudan and Angola. 
b: UNCTAD’s estimate for total LDCs is $13,375m; the above figures exclude Sudan and Angola. 
c. Iincludes China, excludes LDCs. 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on UNCTAD (2008.c) . 
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African FDI in the textiles and clothing sector of African LDCs has taken place. For 
example, Mauritian, South African and Libyan firms invested small amounts in 
Madagascar, Lesotho and Uganda, respectively. Some investment by foreign firms has 
also taken place in the financial sector and telecommunications by purchasing local firms 
(UNCTAD (2008.c), pp. 42-3). Investment in the public utilities and infrastructure of 
LDCs is not however significant either; its share in total inward FDI was nearly 26 per 
cent in 2006 (Ibid., Table A.III.1). A few factors are responsible for the lack of attraction 
of FDI and the lack of its contribution to the development of local firms and local 
economies in low-income countries, particularly their manufacturing sectors. These 
factors include the weak capabilities of domestic firms, low skills and productivity, the 
lack of infrastructure and back-up services.  
 The question is, “does FDI contribute to bridging the knowledge gap and 
raising technical maturity?” as claimed by Elkan (1996) and others. In fact, a test of the 
impact of FDI on the industrialization of a developing country is its impact on the 
development of local capabilities through spill-over channels of demonstration effects, 
learning effects and linkage effects (Paus,2005). Such capabilities can be influenced, 
inter alia, by experience, skill development and the accumulation of knowledge by the 
labour force of the host country. Generally speaking, the findings of the literature on the 
spill-over effects of FDI on the host country are mixed (see Gorg. In countries where the 
government has developed the capabilities of national firms, managed and targeted FDI, 
supported R&D and technological development and training etc, the country has 
benefited from FDI in its industrialization. On the other hand, where the government has 
followed hands-off policies domestic capabilities have not developed much. The 
contrasting experience of Ireland with Costa Rica (Paus see Görg and Greenaway, 2004), 
2005) and China with Mexico (Gallaher and Shafaeddin, 2009, Gallaher and Zarsky, 
2007 and Shafaeddin and Pizarro, 2009) provide good indications in this respect. The 
experience of both Mexico and Costa Rica reveals that liberalizing FDI and leaving the 
activities of TNCs to the operation of market forces will not raise the domestic 
capabilities for enhancing industrialization and development. By contrast, China and 
Ireland have succeeded in considerable development of technological capabilities of their 
own local firms because of the active role of their governments. In other words, to benefit 
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from FDI, there is a need for the development of the capabilities of the national firms. 
Such development requires nurturing (Lall, 2005). 
 
ix. EPZs and industrialization 
The potential contribution of FDI in export processing zones (EPZs) to industrialization 
also depends on an active role for the government. EPZs can contribute to 
industrialization if they are arranged within the context of the industrial strategy of the 
country, or countries which get involved in industrial collaboration. According to the 
latest data available by ILO, there are 3,500 EPZs and similar types of zone in 130 
countries, out of which 155 operate in Africa (90 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 65 in North 
Africa) and 50 in the Middle East. The successful ones are, however, a handful. For 
example in Africa and the Middle East, only two countries are regarded as successful: the 
United Arab Emirates and Mauritius.  The UAE’s is basically a free trade zone rather 
than an EPZ, as little processing takes place in the country.  
 While Mauritius achieved export expansion for a while with the support of 
the government, there has so far been limited success in upgrading of its industrial 
structure despite over three decades of involvement in an EPZ. The country first started 
its EPZ in 1971. At the time, it was a tiny country of less than a million people with 
heavy dependence on the production and export of sugar. In 2006, manufactured goods 
constituted nearly 67 per centper cent of its exports. 
 Initially, Mauritius managed to increase its exports fast by concentrating on 
the production of textiles and clothing. Exports increased at an average annual rate of 
14.4 per cent during the 1980s, but the corresponding rate declined to 4.3 per cent in the 
1990s and 1.82 per cent during 2000-07. In 2007, when the exports of developing 
countries expanded by nearly 15 per cent, the figure for Mauritius was in fact negative    
(-11.9 per cent) (UNCTAD, 2008.a: tables1.1.1 and1.2.1). The termination of the MFA 
was an important factor. 
 Mauritius began to update its export structure by diversifying into the 
production of telecommunications equipment in the early years of this century in 
anticipation of the termination of MFA. The country needs, however, to make further 
efforts to diversify and upgrade its production and export structure further as it has also 
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lost its privileged position in the EU market for its exports of sugar. As is shown in the 
following table, the latest available data indicate that the country’s achievement in 
upgrading its production structure is not impressive. 
 
Table 34 
The structure of manufacturing output of Mauritius (1995-2004) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Product Groups     1995  2004 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Food, beverages and tobacco   25  24 
Textiles and clothing    52  51 
Machinery and transport equipment    2    2 
Other manufacturing and unallocated data 21  24 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008, Table 4.3. 
 
Despite such a shortcoming, Mauritius has been more successful in its EPZ operation 
than other African countries. The neo-liberals attribute the success of the country in its 
growth of exports and GDP to its implementation of structural adjustment and open door 
policies (see e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995 and 1997). Nevertheless, this is a simplistic and 
distorted view. Mauritius pursued a complex strategy somewhat close to the East Asian 
NIEs. First, the country remained a highly protected economy during the 1970s and 
1980s, when the effective rate of protection exceeded 100 per cent before reducing to 65 
per cent in the late 1980s (Subramanian, 2009: 9). Even until the late 1990s, the nominal 
tariff rate on manufactured goods exceeded on average 31 per cent; for light 
manufactured goods it was even higher, at 34 per cent (UNCTAD,2008.a:table 4.3).  
 Secondly, the export sector in the EPZ enjoyed a number of privileges, including 
free access to imported inputs, tax holidays (which are a sort of subsidy) and the low 
wages of women, who were the main employees in the EPZ. In other words, the trade 
policy incentive was neutral for exports and imports, but at a high level of government 
intervention.  
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 Thirdly, the government intervention did not stop at trade policy and fiscal 
measures; and the provision of incentives to domestic firms was not the only factor. The 
government took other measures including institutional arrangements and provision of 
incentives to domestic firms to operate in the EPZ alongside TNCs. While foreign firms 
were active in EPZ, only 12 per cent of the total employment and 50 per cent of the total 
equity of firms were accounted for by foreign firms. A number of other measures and 
institutional arrangements were also made to enhance the capabilityies of domestic firms 
to promote exports. Further institutional and organizational arrangements were made by 
the government to enhance its own capabilities in promoting investment, developing and 
operating industrial sites and estates, and planning and reviewing export oriented 
arrangements (http://fdimagazine.com/news, October 20th, 2004). 
 Finally, the country enjoyed preferential market access to Europe and the USA 
through the MFA and followed a competitive exchange rate policy (Subramanian, 2009). 
Participatory politics was another factor in the management of conflict of interests among 
the diverse ethnic groups in the country. 
 Some of the policy instruments which were available to Mauritius are no longer 
available to LDCs because of the changes in international trade rules, but they still have 
some room to manoeuvre for the expansion of supply capabilities as mentioned before. 
Furthermore, they benefit from privileged access to markets in developed countries, i.e. 
in the EU through EBA (Everything Except Arms) and in the USA through the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Moreover, through regional agreements they can 
benefit from preferential arrangements for production sharing through industrial 
collaboration as explained above. 
 In short, policies for increasing the contribution of FDI to industrialization and 
development, whether or not through EPZs, should address two issues: the management 
of FDI and its direction to specific sectors and industries which can provide linkages and 
spill-over to other sectors; enhancing the capabilities of domestic firms, inter alia, by 
functional and selective intervention. The question again boils down to the industrial 
strategy of the country.  
 Before ending this section let us mention a few words about remote Island countries. 
These Islands have transport problems, despite their access to the sea, because of the 
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small scale of their volume of trade in relation to the capacity of cargo ships. Most of 
these Islands depend on tourism. They may consider following a policy consisting of 
foreign reserve management and specialization in various types of tourism. For example 
some may specialize in sports tourism, others in health tourism, luxury tourism, academic 
tourism, etc. Furthermore, they may invest in areas which provide backward linkages to 
the tourism sector such as food processing. Those which are in close proximity with each 
other may also arrange some production sharing. 
 
The role of UNIDO 
 
UNIDO can contribute little to short-term counter-cyclical policies to remedy the 
economic crisis facing LDCs. It is, however, endowed with tools which can assist both 
industrial supply expansion for the diversification of LDCs which depend on primary 
commodities, and the upgrading of the industrial structure of “manufactures exporter” 
LDCs. Generally speaking, UNIDO can assist them mainly in the areas of technology, 
training, industrial collaboration and feasibility studies. 
 
1. Technology acquisition and development 
UNIDO can assist LDCs in the acquisition of technology by providing them with 
information on sources of technology, particularly from other developing countries and 
China, and their suitability. It also can provide assistance in arranging cooperation on 
R&D, particularly among countries which are - or will be - involved in industrial 
collaboration and production sharing. 
 
2. Training 
UNIDO can play an important role in technical training for operating machines, for 
technology modification and development as well as R&D. 
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3. Industrial collaboration 
UNIDO may assist countries in feasibility studies for arranging industrial 
collaboration, particularly in identifying products and parts and components for 
production sharing for industrial supply expansion and upgrading. 
 
4. Provision of advice and training for the formulation and implementation of 
industrial policies  
UNIDO may provide assistance in the development of a competitive industrial 
structure and its upgrading, based on the principle of dynamic comparative advantage. In 
this respect, inter alia, issues such as the identification of areas for supply expansion, the 
clustering of small and medium-sized enterprise (SMEs) and EPZs, including the 
necessary technical advice, feasibility studies and training, may also be considered. 
 
5. Cooperation with other UN organizations  
i. In cooperation with ITC and UNCTAD, UNIDO can provide market information 
and identify marketing channels for new manufacturing products.  
ii. In cooperation with UNDP, UNIDO may provide assistance in the development of 
back-up services necessary for industrial cooperation and regional trade expansion in 
manufactured products. 
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Annexes 
 
Table  A.1: 
Main characteristics of Least Developed Countries (2006)  
 
Export group & 
countries 
Characte
r-istics 
Population 
(millions) 
Manu-
facturing/ 
GDP (per 
cent) 
Exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
Manu-
factured 
Exports/ 
Total Exports 
(per cent) 
Exports/ 
GDP 
(per cent) 
Imports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Export-
Import/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Accumu-
lated 
Debts/GDP 
(per cent) 
(2005) 
Debt 
Service/ 
Exports 
(2005) 
Petroleum & 
Natural Gas  197.1 5.94 58,894.3 5.55 41.64 32.86 8.78 43.83 5.75 
   D. Rep. of 
   Congo 8, H 60.6 5.4 2,300.2 2.3 31.38 42.63 -11.25 131.1 8.3 
   Myanmar 7 48.4 9.3 4,863.3 18.8 0.12 0.07 0.04 .. .. 
   Sudan 6, H 37.7 8.3 5,478.7 2.9 27.10 23.55 3.55 51.2 5.9 
   Yemen 5, 21.7 6.4 6264 2.8 47.23 44.93 2.31 29.2 .. 
    Angola 4 16.6 3.8 33,795 0.3 74.21 46.83 27.38 21.2 7.6 
    Chad 4, L, H 10.5 6.7 2,274.7 2.5 55.74 27.45 28.29 27.1 1.2 
    East Timor 2, I 1.1 2.6 114.1 10.7 2.22 39.72 -37.50 .. .. 
    Equ.Guinea 1, L 0.5 5 3,804.3 4.1 95.13 37.70 57.43 3.2 .. 
Other Minerals  88.8 8.49 10,699.7 6.48 25.21 36.59 -11.38 66.57 9.09 
    Mozambique 5, H 21 13 2,381.1 5.6 42.28 37.49 4.80 47.8 2.3 
    Niger 4, H 13.7 6.5 355.7 7.1 18.94 31.57 -12.64 22 .. 
    Mali 4, L, H 12 9 1,476.6 5.2 28.62 34.64 -6.01 24.5 3.7 
    Zambia 4, L, H 11.7 11.2 3,770.4 16 18.77 26.71 -7.94 21.7 4.7 
    Guinea 3, H 9.2 4.1 976.2 10.8 26.12 36.15 -10.02 98.9 12.2 
    Burundi 3, L, H 8.2 13.2 120.1 2.4 9.25 39.34 -30.09 156.2 39.6 
    Sierra Leone 3, H 5.7 2.5 216.6 8.2 16.50 40.01 -23.51 98.5 6.2 
   C.A. Republic 2, L, H 4.3 11.2 144.3 1.5 11.51 22.60 -11.09 68.3 0.3 
   Mauritania 2, H 3 5.7 1,258.7 1.5 54.91 60.81 -5.90 61.2 3.7 
Agriculture  107 8.48 4,408.9 10.11 25.81 44.90 -19.09 100.76 12.38 
   Uganda 5, L, H 29.9 9 962.2 9.1 14.41 32.16 -17.74 13.4 9.4 
   Afghanistan 5, L, H 26.1 14.7 179.6 17.4 32.88 80.94 -48.06 21.1 .. 
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Table A.1 continued 
Export group & 
countries 
Characte
r-istics 
Population 
(millions) 
Manu-
facturing/ 
GDP (per 
cent) 
Exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
Manu-
factured 
Exports/ 
Total Exports 
(per cent) 
Exports/ 
GDP 
(per cent) 
Imports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Exports-
Imports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Accumu-
lated 
Debts/GDP 
(per cent) 
(2005) 
Debt 
Service/ 
Exports 
(2005) 
  Burkina Faso 4, L, H 14.4 13.3 482.9 8.3 9.11 23.96 -14.84 18.5 6.2 
  Malawi 4, L, H 13.6 11.6 668.4 13.2 24.30 55.32 -31.02 26.9 11.1 
  Benin 3, H 8.8 8.3 283.1 6.5 18.52 27.81 -9.29 17.3 .. 
  Somali 3, H 8.4 2.5 160.8 6.4 0.31 1.69 -1.38 .. .. 
  Liberia 2, H 3.6 10.2 1,490.2 8.3 33.88 46.62 -12.75 423.8 .. 
  G-Bissau 2, H 1.6 .. 83.9 14.2 35.36 49.53 -14.17 233.6 22.8 
  Kiribati 1, I 0.1 0.8 6.3 16.3 30.24 71.89 -41.65 .. .. 
  Solomon Is 1, I 0.5 5.9 91.5 1.4 59.08 59.12 -0.04 51.5 .. 
Manufactured  209.8 11.60 18,259 68.09 30.64 64.34 -33.69 44.05 5.95 
  Bangladesh 9, H 156 16.6 11,962.6 80.8 17.98 25.54 -7.55 33.2 6.5 
  Nepal 5, L, H 27.6 7.5 759.7 48.5 18.55 37.72 -19.17 38.1 9.6 
  Cambodia 4 14.2 20.9 3,990.5 73 68.97 78.61 -9.64 48.6 0.4 
  Haiti 3, H 9.4 7.8 522.6 70.2 14.25 43.12 -28.87 23.9 6.4 
  Lesotho 2, L 2 17.4 671.9 69.3 41.83 86.70 -44.86 44.8 10.6 
  Bhutan 1, L 0.6 7.6 348.2 47.6 40.36 64.66 -24.30 75.7 2.2 
  Tuvalu 1, I 0 [10,000] 3.4 3.5 87.2 12.56 114.00 -101.44 .. .. 
Services  139.4 6.43 3,297 6.66 30.15 57.61 -27.45 85.82 8.97 
  Ethiopia 8, L, H 81 4.6 1,043 2.6 15.10 32.62 -17.52 17.5 3.8 
  Tanzania 6, H 39.5 6.9 1,689.9 3.5 23.51 32.86 -9.35 33.2 2.4 
  Rwanda 3, L, H 9.5 9.2 135.4 4.4 9.59 34.52 -24.93 16.8 6.7 
  Eritrea 3, L, H 4.7 10.4 11.2 2 5.15 42.27 -37.12 73.7 23.2 
  Gambia 2, H 1.7 5.3 11.5 3.7 51.49 69.92 -18.43 142 .. 
  Comoros 1, I, H 0.8 4.2 7.5 3.7 12.06 30.78 -18.72 69.9 8.1 
  Djibouti 1 0.8 2.8 18.9 1.2 42.19 54.88 -12.68 60.3 4.4 
  Cape Verde 1, I 0.5 4.6 110.3 7.1 16.34 51.82 -35.49 52.5 14.2 
  Maldives 1, I 0.3 6.6 135.6 5.4 82.60 105.91 -23.31 49.5 .. 
  Samoa 1, I 0.2 15.2 84.9 36.9 30.19 53.91 -23.71 202.5 .. 
  Sao T.&Principe 1, I 0.2 3.9 3.9 1.1 30.74 123.08 -92.33 289.7 .. 
  Vanuatu 1,I 0.2 3.5 44.9 8.3 42.88 58.69 -15.82 22.2 .. 
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Table A.1 continued 
Export group & 
countries 
Characte
r-istics 
Population 
(millions) 
Manu-
facturing/ 
GDP (per 
cent) 
Exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
Manu-
factured 
Exports/ 
Total Exports 
(per cent) 
Exports/ 
GDP 
(per cent) 
Imports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Exports-
Imports/ 
GDP 
(per 
cent) 
Accumu-
lated 
Debts/GDP 
(per cent) 
(2005) 
Debt 
Service/ 
Exports 
(2005) 
Diversified  43.5 14.45 3,736 31.50 31.25 42.29 -11.04 54.20 8.23 
  Madagascar 7, H 19.2 15.4 1,008.2 29.1 27.39 40.40 -13.02 26.4 4.1 
  Senegal 4 12.1 16.2 1,491.6 26.6 26.56 43.53 -16.97 21.6 7.2 
  Togo 3, H 6.4 6.1 359.7 37.9 39.08 56.21 -17.14 81.9 .. 
  Laos 3, L 5.8 20.1 876.5 32.4 31.98 29.02 2.96 86.9 13.4 
 
Notations: H : highly indebted; L: landlocked; numbers refer to population groups: 1: less than 1 million; 2: 1m-5m.; 3: 5m-10m; 4: 10m-20m.; 5: 
20m-30m.; 6: 30m-40m.; 7: 40m-50m.; 8: 50m-100m; 9: more than 150m. 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.b), various tables and (2008.a), Table 8.3.1. 
 
 
Table A.2: 
Population of Various LDCs in 2006 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Population No. of        Countries  
(millions) countries ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Africa & Haiti        Asia 
Less than one 13  Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equ. Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe Bhutan, Maldives, Vanuatu, Tuvalu,
       ,       Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa 
1-5     7  Central African Rep., Eritrea, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania East Timor 
5-10  10  Benin, Burundi, Guinea, Haiti, Mali, Rwanda, S. Leone, Somalia, Togo Laos 
10-20    9  Angola, B. Faso, Chad, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Zambia Cambodia 
20-30    5  Mozambique, Uganda       Afganistan, Nepal, Yemen 
30-40    2  Sudan, Tanzania 
40-50    1           Myanmar 
50-10    2  Congo, Ethiopia 
>150    1           Bangladesh 
--------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.b). 
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Table A.3: 
Projected Annual Average Growth Rate of GDP for Individual LDCs (2008-09) 
 
Countries Year Countries Year 
Africa 2008 2009 Island  2008 2009 
     Equatorial Guinea 11.3 -5.4      Maldives 5.7 -1.3 
     Angola 14.8 -3.6      Comoros 1 0.8 
     Madagascar 5 -0.2      Kiribati 3.4 1.5 
     Lesotho 3.5 0.6      Cape Verde 5.9 2.5 
     Haiti 1.3 1      Vanuatu 6.6 3 
     Eritrea 1 1.1      Samoa 4.5 4 
     Togo 1.1 1.7      Solomon Islands 7.3 4 
     Guinea-Bissau 3.3 1.9      Sao Tome and Principe 5.8 5 
     Mauritania 2.2 2.3      East Timor 12.8 7.2 
     Central African Republic 2.2 2.4      Tuvalu .. .. 
     Guinea 4 2.6 Average Island 5.89 2.97 
     Dem. Rep. of the Congo 6.2 2.7    
     Chad -0.4 2.8 Asia   
     Niger 9.5 3      Cambodia 6 -0.5 
     Senegal 2.5 3.1      Nepal 4.7 3.6 
     Burkina Faso 5 3.5 
     Laos People's Dem.                  
Republic 7.2 4.4 
     Burundi 4.5 3.5      Myanmar 4.5 5 
     Benin 5 3.8      Bangladesh 5.6 5 
     Mali 5 3.9      Bhutan 6.6 5.7 
     Gambia 5.9 4      Yemen 3.9 7.7 
     Sudan 6.8 4      Afghanistan 3.4 9 
     Zambia 6 4 Average Asia 5.24 4.99 
     Mozambique 6.2 4.3    
     Sierra Leone 5.5 4.5 All LDCs 5.72 3.3 
     Liberia 7.1 4.9    
     United Rep.of Tanzania 7.5 5    
     Djibouti 5.8 5.1    
     Rwanda 11.2 5.6    
     Uganda 9.5 6.2    
     Ethiopia 11.6 6.5    
     Malawi 9.7 6.9    
     Somalia .. ..    
Average Africa 5.8 2.96    
 
Source: Based on IMF 2009.b ( April). 
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Appendix 4 
List of countries included in IMF, WEO 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Africa and Haiti Asia Islands  
 
Angola Bangladesh Comoros  
Benin Bhutan Kiribati  
Burkina Faso Cambodia Maldives  
Burundi 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic Samoa  
 
Central African Republic 
 
Myanmar 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Chad Nepal Solomon Islands 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Yemen Vanuatu  
Djibouti    
Equatorial Guinea    
Eritrea    
Ethiopia    
Gambia    
Guinea    
Guinea-Bissau    
Haiti    
Lesotho    
Madagascar    
Malawi    
Mali    
Mauritania    
Mozambique    
Niger    
Rwanda    
Senegal    
Sierra Leone    
Sudan    
United Republic of Tanzania    
Togo    
Uganda    
Zambia    
    
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 Based on UNCTAD (2008.a) and UNIDO (2009), Tables 9.1 and 10.4. 
 
2
 Based on UNCTAD (2008,a), Tables 3.2.D and 3.1. 
 
3
 Calculated by the author based on UNCTAD (2009.a), Table 5.  
 
4
 These are: Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, the Gambia, Kiribati, the Maldives, Nepal, Somalia 
and Afghanistan. Note that Cape Verde is not included as an LDC as of January 2009. 
 
5
 Finger and Schuler (2000), p. 525.  According to the ACP Secretariat, the operational costs of SPS alone 
“represent overheads of between 2 per cent and 10 per cent of the value of produce exported by the vast 
majority of ACP countries” (CTA, 2003, p. 3).  
 
6
 The share of banking assets held by foreign banks (owned mainly by developed countries)  is very high in 
some countries ranging, for example, from 53 per cent in the case of Angola to 100 per cent in the cases of 
Madagascar, Mozambique and Swaziland. Nevertheless, the financial meltdown suffered by the parent 
banks was not transmitted to their subsidiaries in these countries (AfDB, 2009 .a, pp. 2-4). 
 
7
 Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (the same source as table 22). 
 
8
  According to the Engel’s Law as the income of the household increases, the percentage of family budget 
spent on food declines, But when income declines, the households cut more on their luxury goods than food 
items as there is a minimum of consumption needed for survival. In other words, there is a “ratchet effect” 
in favour of food consumption. 
 
9
 For the structure of Nepal’s exports see Shafaeddin (2008). 
 
10
 LDC Watch, (http//www.ldcwatch.org/wcm/index.php), June 2009. 
 
11
 Note that the price of manufactured goods exported by industrialized countries is cost-determined, but 
the prices of massive exports of low-skilled manufactured goods those of primary commodities are 
demand-determined.  
 
12
 Based on Serieux (2009), pp. 23-24. 
 
13
 . Note that Zambia still figures in the list of heavily indebted countries even though its debt/GDP ratio 
has decreased in more recent years. 
  
14
  Only Somalia, Malawi and Angola did not devalue over the period concerned. A number of other 
countries devalued less than five per cent. 
 
15
 The World Bank argues in favour of an arrangement for repatriation of capital flight to Sub-Saharan 
countries (Fofack and Ndikumana, 2009).  But such an arrangement seems unrealistic technically, legally 
and politically. It is not clear why the easier option of capital controls is not proposed. 
 
16
  In 2006 the price index of food items was already over 48 per cent higher than that in 2003. 
 
17
 For more details see Shafaeddin (2005.a), pp. 26-27. 
 
18
 For the earlier periods see also UNCTAD (2005.b). 
 
